| Operations Odyssey Dawn and Unified Protector: A Coercive Failure? |
06 Dec 2012 |
53 pages |
| Authors:
Richard A Goodman; ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES
|
 | Coercion theory centers on an actor's ability to influence the decision making of an opponent. This monograph examines two military operations that occurred in Libya in 2011, Operation Unified Protector and Operation Odyssey Dawn, through the lens of coercion theory. The monograph seeks to answer the following question: If the United States and its allies attempted to apply coercion theory against Gaddafi preceding and during military operations, why did he ... |
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| A First-cut Concept Map: The Irregular Adversary (Insurgent) |
Dec 2012 |
93 pages |
| Authors:
James W Moore; DEFENCE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT TORONTO (CANADA)
|
| The Socio-Cognitive Systems (SCS) Section at Defence Research and Development Canada-Toronto (DRDC-Toronto) has undertaken a Technology Investment Fund (TIF) Project entitled A Conceptual Framework for Understanding Armed Non-state Actors (ANSAs): Strategic Roles and Operational Dynamics. The aim of this Project is to advance our understanding of the strategic roles of ANSAs in the context of violent intergroup conflict, and the operational dynamics of ANSAs that facilitate the performance of these ... |
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| The Decline of the Military Ethos and Profession of Arms: An Argument Against Autonomous Lethal Engagements |
Oct 2012 |
41 pages |
| Authors:
Michael R Contratto; AIR WAR COLL MAXWELL AFB AL
|
| Throughout history many new weapon technologies have been introduced into combat prior to a full evaluation or understanding of the doctrinal, legal, and ethical implications of their use. Similarly, today's battlespace is witnessing the introduction of numerous robotic systems to conduct many military missions. Thus far these robots still operate with humans directly in the loop of the decision process, especially when that loop is part of an offensive kill ... |
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| Inference Management: Trust and Obfuscation in Coalition Settings |
20 Sep 2012 |
9 pages |
| Authors:
Chatschik Bisdikian; Murat Sensoy; Nir Oren; Christopher Burnett; Timothy J Norman; Mani B Srivastava; Lance Kaplan; IBM THOMAS J WATSON RESEARCH CENTER HAWTHORNE NY
|
| In modern coalition operations, decision makers must be capable of obtaining and fusing information from diverse sources. The reliability of these sources can vary, and, to protect their interests, the information these sources provide could be altered, e.g., obfuscated, to limit the inferences that can be made with it. The trustworthiness of fused information depends on both the reliability of these sources and their inference management policies. Information consumers must ... |
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| Shift Focus on the Al Qaeda Network: A More Comprehensive Approach to Defeating Al Qaeda |
15 Jun 2012 |
111 pages |
| Authors:
Don Wetherbee; NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIV NORFOLK VA JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING SCHOOL
|
| The Al Qaeda Network is a global insurgency. However, the United States and much of the western world continue to identify it as a global terrorist organization. This improper label misleads planners at both the strategy development level and the operational level. As a result, the national strategy and operational approach are not properly focused. The nation must recognize Al Qaeda as a global insurgency and adjust both the national ... |
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| The French Officers: Craftsmen of the Conquest and Pacification of Tonkin (1871-1897) |
08 Jun 2012 |
173 pages |
| Authors:
Maurice R de Saint Victor; ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS
|
| From 1871 to 1897, France progressively expanded her colonization over Tonkin, also called Indochine, in the North of Vietnam. Three attempts were necessary to completely gain control of, then pacify, this territory. Navy and Army officers played a crucial role in this expansion by integrating their action into the political agenda. In such a context, they successively challenged the Annamites and Chinese armies, then local piracy and insurgency. Based on ... |
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| Every Soldier a Messenger: Using Social Media in the Contemporary Operating Environment |
17 May 2012 |
57 pages |
| Authors:
Dennis G Wille; ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES
|
| Social media has become an additional element within the operational environment within which nearly anyone with an Internet connection can participate. The speed at which participants can add content, truthful or not, to that battle space has forced the Army to change the way it has traditionally approached social media. Information age military theorists have postulated that high-speed computing and ubiquitous network connectivity, key components of social media capabilities, would ... |
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| Center of Gravity within the Ill-Structured Problem |
04 May 2012 |
19 pages |
| Authors:
Chad Livingston; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT
|
| Our currently military planning processes center around Clausewitz's theory of a center of gravity. We spend countless hours debating in an attempt to find the true center of gravity toward which all our actions should be directed to achieve the stated objective. It is important to note that Clausewitz developed his center of gravity concept out of his own experiences, mostly during the Napoleonic War, a time in which traditional ... |
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| Inform and Influence 2020: MISO Transformation for Operational Success |
22 Mar 2012 |
34 pages |
| Authors:
Michael G Barger; PEACEKEEPING AND STABILITY OPERATIONS INST FORT LEAVENWORTH KS
|
| A series of new challenges for our military leaders will emerge in the next decade as declining budgets reduce the means available to respond to contingencies around the world. These emerging contingencies will be both more complex and more volatile than in the past, requiring a wider mix of military capabilities if the United States is to succeed in shaping and maintaining international stability and security. Each emerging contingency will ... |
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| Strategic Decision to Utilize Abu Ghraib |
22 Mar 2012 |
30 pages |
| Authors:
Sr DiNenna David; PEACEKEEPING AND STABILITY OPERATIONS INST FORT LEAVENWORTH KS
|
| The stigma associated with the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq under Saddam Hussein was one of fear, torture, and executions. This paper will examine the United States' strategic decision to utilize Abu Ghraib prison in June 2003 as its premiere confinement facility in Iraq. The paper also will discuss the implications of that decision, and the strategic failure of the U.S. military in planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom Internment/Resettlement operations. ... |
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| The Fragility of Air Dominance |
22 Mar 2012 |
36 pages |
| Authors:
IV Waite Ralph J; ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA
|
| Today the United States military is facing what is described as a budget catastrophe despite continued threats from asymmetric, conventional, and nonconventional forces. At the same time, the world is experiencing a shift to a multi-nodal world that challenges regional stability. The U.S. military is required to operate across the full spectrum of operations to meet National Military Strategy objectives in an environment that is experiencing a revolution in military ... |
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| The Strategic Importance of Defeating Underground Facilities |
20 Mar 2012 |
40 pages |
| Authors:
Craig R Baker; ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA
|
| America's potential adversaries have realized that current non-nuclear penetrating weapons are relatively ineffective in destroying underground facilities. According to the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the use of underground facilities...is expanding as potential adversaries conceal and protect their most vital national security functions and activities. National security functions and activities include but are not limited to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), the means of delivering WMD, anti-access weapons, senior ... |
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| Cyberspace: Time to Reassess, Reorganize, and Resource for Evolving Threats |
15 Mar 2012 |
36 pages |
| Authors:
Steven L Hite; ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA
|
| A decade into the 21st Century, the United States must transition its attention from national security problems that exist in the physical world to security challenges in cyberspace. Assaults on American critical infrastructure, government and defense networks, corporate business networks, and financial networks will continue to grow as adversaries expand their cyber capabilities to achieve their goals. To effectively counter these expanding cyber threats, the U.S. Government must reassess, reorganize, ... |
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| Turkey: Enduring Partner or Emerging Foe? |
13 Mar 2012 |
38 pages |
| Authors:
Martin C Clausen; ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA
|
| This paper examines the strategic direction of the bilateral relationship between the United States and Turkey. Two opposing assessments characterize Turkey in this relationship: one as enduring partner and the other as an emerging foe. This paper posits that a 21st Century U.S.-Turkish relationship must continue to build on its historical foundation to realize the strategic potential of Turkey's newly found regional influence. The United States must elevate Turkey's standing ... |
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| Constructivism -- Is the United States Making China an Enemy? |
12 Mar 2012 |
36 pages |
| Authors:
Bryan Patridge; ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA
|
| This paper uses the theory of Constructivism in the context of international relations to determine if the United States is turning China into a future and formal enemy. Constructivism is explained using basic principles of Alexander Wendt's and Nicholas Onuf's view of constructivist theory. Principles of their theory are combined with historical examples, current U.S. policy, and U.S. decision makers' comments and speeches to show how China is framed as ... |
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| Analysing the New Taliban Code of Conduct (Layeha): An Assessment of Changing Perspectives and Strategies of the Afghan Taliban |
Mar 2012 |
17 pages |
| Authors:
Thomas H Johnson; Matthew C DuPee; NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA DEPT OF NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
|
| Periodically, Afghanistan's Taliban leadership formally issues Layeha or codes of conduct for their fighters and supporters. Layeha offer important insights into the Afghan Taliban's objectives, strategies, and the psyche/perspective of Taliban leadership. This article presents an analysis of the Taliban's code of conduct and examines what Layeha tell us about Taliban objectives, strategy, and organization. Such information would seem particularly important as the United States and its coalition allies assess ... |
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| Using Multiattribute Utility Copulas in Support of UAV Search and Destroy Operations |
Mar 2012 |
61 pages |
| Authors:
Beau A Nunnally; AIR FORCE INST OF TECH WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB OH DEPT OF OPERATIONAL SCIENCES
|
| The multiattribute utility copula is an emerging form of utility function used by decision analysts to study decisions with dependent attributes. Failure to properly address attribute dependence may cause errors in selecting the optimal policy. This research examines two scenarios of interest to the modern warfighter. The first scenario employs a utility copula to determine the type, quantity, and altitude of UAVs to be sent to strike a stationary target. ... |
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| Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance |
27 Feb 2012 |
67 pages |
| Authors:
Kenneth Katzman; LIBRARY OF CONGRESS WASHINGTON DC CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
|
| Building capacity and limiting corruption at all levels of Afghan governance are crucial to the success of a planned transition from U.S.-led NATO forces to Afghan security leadership by the end of 2014. The capacity of the formal Afghan governing structure has increased significantly since the Taliban regime fell in late 2001, but many positions at the local level are unfilled. Nepotism and political considerations in hiring are entrenched in ... |
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| Minority Report: Potential Challenges in Employing Global Strike Against Violent Non-State Actors in 2035 |
13 Feb 2012 |
32 pages |
| Authors:
Timothy D West; AIR WAR COLL MAXWELL AFB AL
|
| The computing environment of 2035 is projected to be vastly different from that of today. Assuming that processing power continues to double every 18 months in accordance with Moore's Law, computers will be 41,285 times more powerful. Further, the environment will likely be saturated with microchips: in our walls, our furniture, our clothes, and even in our bodies. As a result, many analysts share a common belief that it will ... |
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| WHAM: Winning Hearts and Minds in Afghanistan and Elsewhere |
Feb 2012 |
85 pages |
| Authors:
Thomas Henriksen; JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS UNIV MACDILL AFB FL
|
| Politics is as old as war. And political calculation has been a part of military strategy since time out of mind. Alexander and Caesar made temporary alliances, spared the lives of combatants, granted benefits to subjugated peoples, and divided enemies not from any humanitarian impulses but from canny political assessment. Turning an erstwhile adversary into a battlefield ally made for shrewd military politics. Numbers matter in conflict. Increasing the size ... |
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| Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) |
17 Jan 2012 |
76 pages |
| Authors:
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON DC
|
| This paper proposes a concept for how joint forces will achieve operational access in the face of armed opposition by a variety of potential enemies and under a variety of conditions, as part of a broader national approach. Operational access is the ability to project military force into an operational area with sufficient freedom of action to accomplish the mission. Operational access does not exist for its own sake, but ... |
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| Air and Space Power Journal. Volume 26, Number 1, January-February 2012 |
Jan 2012 |
93 pages |
| Authors:
AIR AND SPACE POWER JOURNAL MAXWELL AFB AL
|
| Article in this journal include: Building toward the Future, Air and Space Power Journal s Creative Destruction , What Every Airman Needs to Know about Medical Stability Operations, The Efficiency Paradox, How Hyperefficiency Can Become the Enemy of Victory in War, and Air-Mindedness: the Core of Successful Air Enterprise Development and Partnership between the US and Iraqi Air Forces: One Airman's Perspective. |
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| The Efficiency Paradox: How Hyperefficiency Can Become the Enemy of Victory in War |
Jan 2012 |
19 pages |
| Authors:
Geoffrey F Weiss; AIR COMBAT COMMAND TINKER AFB OK AIRBORNE AIR CONTROL SQUADRON (964TH)
|
| This article seeks to familiarize the reader with the efficiency paradox, much as a treatise would study a potentially dangerous species. If we know where to look and what to look for, then we can avoid potential dangers. Towards that end, the article examines some historical instances of efficiencies pursued in planning and training that failed to produce desired outcomes. Moreover, after addressing how efficiency and effectiveness relate to traditional ... |
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| The Saudi-Iranian Rivalry and the Future of Middle East Security |
Dec 2011 |
96 pages |
| Authors:
W A Terrill; ARMY WAR COLL STRATEGIC STUDIES INST CARLISLE BARRACKS PA
|
| Saudi Arabia and Iran have often behaved as serious rivals for influence in the Middle East, especially the Gulf area, since at least Iran s 1979 Islamic Revolution and the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War. While both nations define themselves as Islamic, the differences between their foreign policies could hardly be more dramatic. In most respects, Saudi Arabia is a regional status quo power, while Iran often seeks revolutionary change throughout the ... |
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| Design Requirements for Weaponizing Man-Portable UAS in Support of Counter-Sniper Operations |
Sep 2011 |
125 pages |
| Authors:
Derek J Snyder; NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA
|
| The sniper is a highly successful tool used by the enemy to create both physical and psychological effects on U.S. and Coalition forces. A single enemy sniper can pin down an entire company-sized element for an extended period of time, resulting in measurable disruptions in operations. This threat is as old as the rifle itself but has been somewhat shadowed by the proliferation of the Improvised Explosive Device (IED) over ... |
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| Application of the Terrestar Satellite Constellation to the Global Initiative for Tracking Special and Nonproliferation Material |
Sep 2011 |
101 pages |
| Authors:
Richard M Camarena; Andrew L Carcich; NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA
|
| In an era distinguished by innovative communication technologies capable of linking with geosynchronous satellites, while being small enough to fit into a pocket of clothing, the modern battlefield commander and warfighter can know the precise location of surrounding friendly forces. This concept of communication involving satellites provides for a new tier of situational awareness in combat and noncombat environments, dating as far back as the Persian Gulf War. This tool ... |
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| Two Runway Interdiction Problems (Revisited) |
Sep 2011 |
32 pages |
| Authors:
Armido R Didonato; NAVAL SURFACE WARFARE CENTER DAHLGREN DIV VA
|
| This report contains a description of two Monte Carlo computer programs and the associated statistical analysis for: (a) Computing the single-run probability of interdicting an enemy rectangular field F, of given size, by NB bombs so that it is made useless as an airfield. (b) Computing the average number of runs or sorties required for a prespecified probability of interdiction under the same conditions. The bombs, each having a circular ... |
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| A Novel Approach for a Hostile Arms Fire Sensor |
10 AUG 2011 |
10 pages |
| Authors:
Joseph R. Montoya; Jorge Melchor; Venu Siddapureddy; Darryl Bryk; ARMY RESEARCH LAB WHITE SANDS MISSILE RANGE NM SURVIVABILITY/LETHALITY ANALYSIS DIRECTORATE
|
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| Establishing a Framework for Intelligence Education and Training |
JUL 2011 |
7 pages |
| Authors:
Rebecca L. Frerichs; Stephen R. Di Rienzo; NATIONAL DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE COLL WASHINGTON DC
|
| In January 2010, Major General Michael T. Flynn, in conjunction with Captain Matt Pottinger and Paul D. Batchelor, published a paper that made the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) stand up and shout. Titled "Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan," the paper attempted to address the weaknesses the authors saw in the collection and use of intelligence in the field. For Flynn and his colleagues, the "tendency ... |
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| Virtual Reality (VR) as a Disruptive Technology |
Jul 2011 |
31 pages |
| Authors:
Lochlan E Magee; DEFENCE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT TORONTO (CANADA)
|
| Defence R&D Canada (DRDC) anticipates, assesses, and provides advice about the impact of emerged and emerging technologies to ensure that Canadian Forces are technologically prepared. In 2011, DRDC is considering Virtual Reality and Neural Interfaces as a potentially disruptive technologies (PDT). The purpose of this position paper is to help inform views on the use of Virtual Reality (VR) for military training by providing answers to specific questions that were ... |
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| The Fallacy of Leadership Removal Strategies in 21st Century Counterinsurgency |
18 JUN 2011 |
81 pages |
| Authors:
Brett R. Hauenstein; NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIV NORFOLK VA JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING SCHOOL
|
| This thesis proves that military planners and policy makers have a predisposition to leadership removal strategies and that these strategies are not effective ways to defeat an insurgency. In the 21st century military planners and policy makers have become enamored with leadership removal as a strategy for defeating enemy organizations. The influence of conventional theorists like Warden and Strange drive planners to overemphasize leadership within an insurgency. Nearly all government ... |
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| Stabilizing the Debate between Population-Centric and Enemy-Centric Counterinsurgency : Success Demands a Balanced Approach |
10 JUN 2011 |
179 pages |
| Authors:
Nathan R. Springer; ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS
|
| This thesis contends the debate on whether to embrace a population-centric or enemy-centric counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan detracts focus from building a balanced approach, customized for the human and political landscape in each area of operation (AO). The debate should be finally resolved since each strategic axis represents a crucial portion of the ideal hybrid approach, which necessarily looks different from one AO to the next. Each extreme, whether focusing ... |
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| Paradigm Change: Targeting Enemy Leadership in a Complex Environment |
10 JUN 2011 |
77 pages |
| Authors:
William H. Shoemate; ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS
|
| As the United States (US) continues operations to neutralize terrorist activity and prepare its military for future hybrid threats, operations to target enemy leadership, in a counterinsurgency environment, have grown in complexity and importance. Over time, insurgent networks have adapted their evasion techniques to counter a superior technological foe. Insurgent networks are providing protected seclusion, constant surveillance, and disruption effects while gaining information superiority. Operating as a network has allowed ... |
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| KITAE III: Unit Construction for Effect in Battlespace Helmand |
JUN 2011 |
|
| Authors:
WILLIAM MITCHELL; ROYAL DANISH DEFENCE COLLEGE COPENHAGEN
|
 | This paper examines a counterinsurgency (COIN) organizational concept developed in Helmand, Afghanistan. The participant observations for this study are taken from daily warfighting activities in one of the most violent areas of Afghanistan, the Upper Gereshk Valley (UGV) in Helmand province, which is within the area of responsibility belonging to Task Force Helmand (TFH) and the Danish Battle Group. It focuses on operations with an Afghan special operations unit known ... |
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| The Enemy Objectives Unit in World War II: Selecting Targets for Aerial Bombardment that Support the Political Purpose of War |
19 MAY 2011 |
56 pages |
| Authors:
Brian P. Ballew; ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES
|
| In June of 1942, Eighth Air Force deployed to Great Britain and began preparation for a bombing campaign. However, during the initial planning efforts it became apparent the staff lacked the expertise needed to analyze and recommend bombing targets. Colonel Richard Hughes, the Chief Planner for American Air Forces in Europe, recognized this deficiency and requested a team to assist with target selection. The Enemy Objectives Unit (EOU), a team ... |
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| Enemies into Allies: American Stability Operations and the Transformation of Japan 1945-1952 |
19 MAY 2011 |
62 pages |
| Authors:
III Skelly Lawrence E.; ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES
|
| The current U.S. Army operating concept prominently includes stability operations built on the core competency of wide area security. Stability operations secure national goals for military action by establishing the conditions for lasting peace after conflict or by mitigating the effects of humanitarian crisis. During the occupation of Japan following the end of World War II, American forces conducted stability operations that effectively did both. In the process, the American ... |
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| USCYBERCOM and Cyber Security: Is a Comprehensive Strategy Possible? |
12 May 2011 |
32 pages |
| Authors:
Michael P Jackson; ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA
|
| In 2008, after a significant breach of its networks, the Department of Defense realized that a military so heavily reliant on cyberspace is also vulnerable to anyone with access to the Internet. With all the national strategic guidance, U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) has yet to develop a comprehensive strategy. USCYBERCOM must create a strategy that fosters unity of effort and unity of action to operate successfully in the cyber domain. ... |
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| Using Social Influence Theory to Increase the Effectiveness of Influence Operations |
May 2011 |
66 pages |
| Authors:
Barrett A Burns; ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES
|
| Since its inception in 2001, the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) has been a geographically limited force addressing a problem that is not geographically constrained. Initially, ISAF operations were limited to Kabul, Afghanistan. In 2003, the United Nations Security Council approved a resolution, UNSCR 1510, that expanded the ISAF mandate from Kabul throughout Afghanistan, but did not provide for operations external to Afghanistan. Recognition of Afghanistan's border as a ... |
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| Sandals and Robes to Business Suits and Gulf Streams: Warfare in the 21st Century |
20 APR 2011 |
8 pages |
| Authors:
Michael T. Flynn; NATO INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE KABUL (AFGHANISTAN)
|
| Warfare used to be a bi-polar structure, state on state. Our defense establishment was more concerned with templating our enemies in a force-on-force engagement that was grounded in understood rules of war.? The battlefield was linear and structured, with clearly defined battle lines. We could isolate, contain, outflank, and attack our enemies well into the depths of the rear of their formations. Our enemies had tangible and recognizable infrastructures that, ... |
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| The Art of Peace |
01 Apr 2011 |
46 pages |
| Authors:
Walter E Piatt; GEORGETOWN UNIV WASHINGTON DC EDMUND A WALSH SCHOOL OF FOREIGN SERVICE
|
| As a career soldier, I have studied the art of war, yet most of what I learned from the great warriors of history did not prepare me for the reality that I had faced in Afghanistan and Iraq. My deployed experiences taught me that I had trained for victory in combat, but had not prepared for the challenges of maneuvering through the quagmire of building peace. I now realize that ... |
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| Selling Engineer Capability to the Maneuver Commander |
Apr 2011 |
4 pages |
| Authors:
V P Baerman; ARMY ENGINEER SCHOOL FORT LEONARD WOOD MO
|
| The maneuver commander on today s battlefield has a vast quantity of combat power at his call. In addition to the correct employment of his direct and indirect fire weaponry, he can effectively increase his combat power with a variety of combat multipliers, such as smoke and electronic warfare. One of the most useful combat multipliers is terrain reinforcement, done either by the maneuver unit alone or, most profitably, in ... |
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| A Reserve Component Force for the 21st Century |
24 Mar 2011 |
32 pages |
| Authors:
Harrison B Gilliam; ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA
|
| Based on the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the military must adjust to meet anticipated and directed threats to U.S. national security. The active component of the U.S. Army is addressing these issues by building a more expeditionary, modular force, capable of projecting power with a rapid response. Army Chief of Staff General George Casey directed a review on transitioning the U.S. Army Reserves and ... |
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| All Wars are Local: Lessons from the Philippine Insurrection |
23 Mar 2011 |
30 pages |
| Authors:
Todd Brost; ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA
|
| The Philippine Insurrection of 1899-1902 is a little remembered part of US history. The US sent forces halfway around the world to fight a conventional enemy with an ill-defined end state, and then found itself in a protracted insurgency fight that grew increasingly unpopular at home. The US Army had to cope with a lack of knowledge about the people, the local politics, and the terrain. The Army adapted to ... |
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| Cracks in the New Jar: The Limits of Tailored Deterrence |
17 Mar 2011 |
40 pages |
| Authors:
Sean P Larkin; ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA
|
| The United States embraced tailored deterrence in its 2006 and 2010 National Security Strategies. Tailored deterrence seeks to customize whole-of-government deterrence strategies to specific actors and scenarios through a deterministic approach that combines rational deterrence theory with effects-based operations concepts. Consequently, tailored deterrence neglects some of the most important elements of contemporary deterrence theory, including the uncertainty and cognitive biases inherent to both intelligence assessments and international relations. While deterrence ... |
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| Counterterrorism v. Counterinsurgency: Lessons from Algeria and Afghanistan |
14 MAR 2011 |
16 pages |
| Authors:
David N. Santos; ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS
|
| In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States the terms of terrorism and insurgency have become part of the everyday American lexicon and for that matter much of the international community's as well. So common has the usage of these terms become that it would appear they are almost interchangeable if not the same. There is, however, a distinction between a terrorist and an insurgent. ... |
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| Offensive Lawfare |
10 Mar 2011 |
38 pages |
| Authors:
Mark W Holzer; ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA
|
| Lawfare is defined in various ways, but it is essentially a way to describe legal activities within the context of armed conflict. The Army s operational concept provides a framework within which to conceptualize offensive lawfare which, in the current global counter-insurgency conflict, should be understood to include efforts to deny enemy forces sanctuary, to blunt their abuse of courts, and to use both foreign and domestic courts to better ... |
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| A Full Spectrum Case for the Heavy Force |
01 Mar 2011 |
30 pages |
| Authors:
Jr Creed Richard D; ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA
|
| The U.S. Army heavy conventional ground capability that crushed Iraqi forces in 1991 and 2003 no longer exists, and the assumption that the U.S. Army can dominate high intensity ground combat operations for the foreseeable future is questionable. The balance of U.S. Army combat brigades shifted significantly from favoring a heavy force to favoring a lighter force over the past decade. Further reduction of HBCTs based upon assumptions that there ... |
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| Conventional Prompt Global Strike: Strategic Asset or Unusable Liability? |
FEB 2011 |
25 pages |
| Authors:
M. E. Bunn; Vincent A. Manzo; NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIV WASHINGTON DC INST FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES
|
| The Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) concept calls for a U.S. capability to deliver conventional strikes anywhere in the world in approximately an hour. The logic of the CPGS concept is straightforward. The United States has global security commitments to deter and respond to a diverse spectrum of threats, ranging from terrorist organizations to near-peer competitors. The United States might need to strike a time-sensitive target protected by formidable air ... |
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| Afghan Peace Talks: A Primer |
Jan 2011 |
|
| Authors:
James Shinn; James Dobbins; RAND CORP ARLINGTON VA NATIONAL SECURITY RESEARCH DIV
|
| In early 2010, when the authors began to participate in exploratory discussions regarding the possibility of a negotiated peace in Afghanistan, the very concept of talking to the enemy was controversial in official circles and little discussed beyond them. The objective of a negotiated peace has since been firmly embraced by both the Afghan and American governments, supported by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and endorsed by most of Afghanistan's ... |
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| Heavy Armor in the Future Security Environment |
Jan 2011 |
10 pages |
| Authors:
David E Johnson; RAND ARROYO CENTER SANTA MONICA CA
|
| With deep budget cuts imminent, the U.S. Army has been under pressure to demonstrate a valid need for heavy brigade combat teams in the future security environment of irregular warfare and of possible air- and sea-centric conflicts with China -- an environment in which many believe that such teams will be largely irrelevant. The purpose of this paper is to explain the utility of heavy armored forces (comprised of tanks ... |
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Reports by Keyword(s)
ENEMY
