| Military Effectiveness: A Reappraisal |
JUL 2007 |
57 pages |
| Authors:
Jeffrey J. Bernasconi; ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES
|
 | Military effectiveness is a common goal among military forces, but it is an ill-defined concept. Two divergent theories cover the ground of military effectiveness. One looks at the interaction of social structures, whereas the other looks at the effect organization has on military effectiveness. Using the interwar German military as a case study, both concepts are reviewed and seams are found in both approaches. Even when evaluating with both criteria, ... |
|
| The Impact of Political-Military Relations on the Use of German Military Power during Operation Barbarossa |
15 JUN 2007 |
104 pages |
| Authors:
Richard W. Carnicky; ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS
|
| The German General Staff launched Operation Barbarossa in June 1941 assuming the eastern campaign would last only 3 months. However, within 6 months after the initiation of hostilities the Red Army blunted the Wehrmacht's attack outside the gates of Moscow. Operation Barbarossa had failed. Although a long-standing and professional organization, the German General Staff failed to achieve strategic success despite significant success during the early stages of the campaign. Adolf ... |
|
| The Practice of Operational Art in Operation Weserubung: The German Invasion of Norway 1940 |
10 MAY 2007 |
19 pages |
| Authors:
Mark A. Rice; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT
|
| In April of 1940, the peaceful and neutral country of Norway became a battleground between Germany, France, and England in their desire to control it for their own war objectives. The Battle of Norway and as the Germans called it, Operation Weseruebung, was the first major military operation in history to utilize naval, ground, air, and airborne forces in the assault phase of the attack. The German success in this ... |
|
| Bluffing with a Pair of Deuces: The Downside of Successful Deception |
JUN 2006 |
81 pages |
| Authors:
Richard R. Sharpe; NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA
|
| Recent changes in warfare have placed a heavy reliance on the ability of a military or state to be able to control all aspects of the information battlespace. It is critical to emphasize the continuing importance of deception on warfare in the Information Age by analyzing past deception campaigns to determine what lessons might be learned. The rearmament of Interwar Germany and Saddam's Iraq provide two examples of modern strategic ... |
|
| U.S. Occupation Assistance: Iraq, Germany and Japan Compared |
23 MAR 2006 |
|
| Authors:
Nina Serafino; Curt Tarnoff; Dick K. Nanto; LIBRARY OF CONGRESS WASHINGTON DC CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
|
 | This report provides aggregate data on U.S. assistance to Iraq and compares it with U.S. assistance to Germany and Japan during the 7 years following World War II. U.S. aid allocations (all grant assistance) for Iraq appropriated from 2003 to 2006 total $28.9 billion. About $17.6 billion (62%) went for economic and political reconstruction assistance. The remaining $10.9 billion (38%) was targeted at bolstering Iraqi security. A higher proportion of ... |
|
| Logistic Support and Insurgency. Guerrilla Sustainment and Applied Lessons of Soviet Insurgent Warfare: Why it Should Still be Studied |
Oct-2005 |
47 pages |
| Authors:
Turbiville; Graham H Jr; JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS UNIV HURLBURT FIELD FL
|
| This is a pertinent and timely study of a critical issue facing the United States military today: how do insurgents logistically sustain and expand their operations? Dr. Turbiville's essay discusses the logistics and sustainment of guerrillas operating in the Soviet Union behind German lines during World War II. The paper is a significant step in addressing the research shortfall on insurgency logistics. Dr. Turbiville posits that there is a high ... |
|
| Luftwaffe Maritime Operations in World War II: Thought, Organization and Technology |
APR 2005 |
60 pages |
| Authors:
Winston A. Gould; AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLL MAXWELL AFB AL
|
| The development of air power can be traced to three key elements: thought, organization, and technology. This paper will examine the Luftwaffe's thinking, organization, and technology as they pertained to Countersea Operations during World War II, with a focus on the Battle of the Atlantic during the period 1939-1945. First, an examination of Luftwaffe thought will show that German air doctrine did not prepare the Luftwaffe for the maritime role ... |
|
| Strategic Decisions and Implications of the German Assault on Norway in 1940 |
18 MAR 2005 |
|
| Authors:
Steinar Amundsen; ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA
|
| The German attack on Norway in 1940 was a swift, ambitious and seemingly risky undertaking. The German Navy's operations were conducted in the teeth of the British Royal Navy. The subsequent amphibious assaults employed very limited forces, spread thinly among several objectives along the long Norwegian seaboard and in the deep Norwegian fjords. Ultimately setting the preconditions for a long-term occupation of Norway, Weseruebung was an operational success and secured ... |
|
| The Battle for Air Supremacy Over the Somme, 1 June-30 November 1916 |
18 JUN 2004 |
155 pages |
| Authors:
Thomas G. Bradbeer; ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS
|
| Much has been written about the Battle of the Somme. From July through late November 1916, British, French, and German armies fought one of the costliest battles of the 20th century. Well over a million casualties and only a few miles of ground gained by the Allies were the result when the battle ended. However, little has been written about the second battle which occurred simultaneously, this one in the ... |
|
| The Influence of Maritime Theorists on the Development of German Naval Strategy from 1930 to 1936 |
17 JUN 2004 |
68 pages |
| Authors:
Donald A. Cribbs; ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS
|
| At the end of World War I, and upon the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, the German Armed Forces had been drastically reduced by the Allies. The German Navy was stripped of its battleships, submarines, and aircraft. The effort to rebuild began immediately following the war. The decision about what direction and shape the Navy would take was influenced by several factors. The German Navy's anticipated enemy, the restrictions ... |
|
| Building Guderian's Duck: Germany's Response to the Eastern Front Antitank Crisis, 1941 to 1945 |
17 JUN 2004 |
101 pages |
| Authors:
Scott M. Chafian; ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS
|
| The appearance of the T-34 in 1941 caused a crisis for German antitank forces. Existing antitank guns were nearly impotent against the new Russian tank, while antiaircraft and artillery pieces, though successful when pressed into action, were insufficiently mobile to accompany mechanized forces. The German Army Ordnance Office, the Heereswaffenamt, was responsible for development of new weapons and would be responsible for countering the threat of Russian armor. The Heereswaffenamt ... |
|
| Beginning of the End: The Leadership of SS Obersturmbannfuehrer Jochen Peiper |
17 JUN 2004 |
163 pages |
| Authors:
Han Bouwmeester; ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS
|
| SS Obersturmbannfuehrer Jochen Peiper was one of Germany's most colorful military leaders of World War II with an audacious reputation. The name Peiper will always be linked to the Malmedy Massacre, the death of Belgian civilians and more than seventy American soldiers, but there is still a myth around Peiper. Why was a twenty-nine year old Waffen-SS officer chosen to lead the German spearhead unit during the Battle of the ... |
|
| "Knowledge Must Become Capability": Institutional Intellectualism as an Agent for Military Transformation |
19 MAR 2004 |
29 pages |
| Authors:
Steven W. Knott; ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA
|
| While the value of individual intellectualism to the profession of arms has been much debated among academics and military professionals in recent years, the dialogue to date has failed to address the salient issue: the concept of institutional intellectualism and its catalytic role as an agent for transformation. Institutional intellectualism is system-sponsored critical thinking that focuses synergistic intellectual capital to effect transformational change and continual renewal within an organization. Consequently, ... |
|
| Primordial Violence: German War on the Soviet Partisans |
2002 |
52 pages |
| Authors:
Gus Kostas; MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLL QUANTICO VA
|
| Clausewitz offers his paradoxical trinity as a viable framework for analyzing the inherent complexities of warfare. The three interdependent, dynamic aspects of the trinity must be balanced against each other if a successful plan for war is to prevail. Additionally, Clausewitz addresses the dynamics of insurgencies and counter insurgencies. With these two analytical frameworks, an examination of a specific campaign becomes plausible. The German war on the Soviet partisans in ... |
|
| Strategic Airpower Elements in Interwar German Air Force Doctrine |
01 JUN 2001 |
104 pages |
| Authors:
William R. Muscha; ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS
|
| Germany reestablished its air force during the last half of the interwar period of 1919 to 1939, a period in which airpower theorists attempted to merge the new technology of aviation with traditional roles of the military. The Royal Air Force adopted the offensive use of airpower to attack enemy sources power as its primary mission and focused on defeating the enemy nation. Great Britain's national strategic situation, its lessons ... |
|
| Germany's Interests and Policy in and Toward the Middle East in the Context of the Arab - Israeli Conflict |
JUN 2001 |
130 pages |
| Authors:
Thomas H. Papenroth; NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA
|
| Over the years Bonn and Berlin's policy and decision-makers adopted a pragmatic multilateral attitude that serves Germany's interests best. Today, Germany executes the concept of a civilian power. Supranationalism and institutional cooperation, followed by integration are the key ideas to formulate and represent power and national interests. As one of the largest industrial and trading nations, Germany is dependent upon a stable and well- functioning economic system that is committed ... |
|
| Analysis of Maintenance Records to Support Prediction of Maintenance Requirements in the German Army |
JUN 2001 |
111 pages |
| Authors:
Jens Hartmann; NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA
|
| Today the German armed forces are faced with a broad, varied and graduated range of tasks including missions outside Germany. A major challenge in planning the force structure for missions like the one in Kosovo is to predict the required maintenance capacities. This thesis conducts an exploratory data analysis of maintenance records of the German Army, using the wheeled reconnaissance tank "Luchs" as an example. The question under investigation is ... |
|
| The Battle for Crete (Operation Mercury): An Operational Analysis |
18 MAY 2001 |
33 pages |
| Authors:
Kenneth J. Cox; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT
|
| In May 1941 the German Luftwaffe conducted the first purely airborne invasion of an island in history. Although German airborne forces would seize the island of Crete their operational objective, the operation was accomplished at great risk of failure and at great cost in personnel and resources due to the lawed application of operational art. Operation Mercury was an operational objective of opportunity following unexpectedly successful operations in Greece and ... |
|
| Implications of Germany's Declining Defense Spending |
JUN 2000 |
139 pages |
| Authors:
Juergen Merrath; NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA
|
| With its reunification on 3 October 1990, Germany regained its full sovereignty and stands now in a position of greater global responsibility. Faced with dramatically increased demands on and expectations for Germany's armed forces, it must answer the question of how much it is willing to invest for safety and stability in Europe and for protection of peace in the world. In determining the level of ... |
|
| Getting it Right Quickly When the Moment Arrives: Lessons from the Interwar German Army for the 21st Century |
01 APR 1999 |
43 pages |
| Authors:
Gordon M. Wells; ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA
|
| What institutionally cnaracterizes armies wno successrully navigated through periods of rapid technological, political, and social change? What kindsof leaders were needed? At the risk of addressing a topic that has been analyzedand dissected by historians and military writers for well over 50 years, I submit there is still much we can learn from the German Army. In particular, theinterwar German Army, or Reichswehr, was an organization that shared many of ... |
|
| Schwerpunkt: The Luftwaffe and the Applied Air Campaign in Europe (1943-1944) |
07 JAN 1999 |
45 pages |
| Authors:
John J. Jacobson; ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA
|
| Attaining air superiority over the German Air Force in 1944 did not in and by itself win the war in Europe, but it did make possible those operations that did. Had the Luftwaffe been able to maintain air superiority over the Continent from 1943-1944, the successful ground invasion at Normandy never would have taken place. Consequently, with his air force in control of theskies over the battlefield, Hitler would have ... |
|
| Deutschland an der Schwelle zum 21. Jahrhundert: gibt es noch eine deutsche Interessenpolitik? (Germany on the Threshold of the 21 Century: is there Still a German Political Interest) |
NOV 1998 |
17 pages |
| Authors:
Gregor Schoellgen; FUEHRUNGSAKADEMIE DER BUNDESWEHR HAMBURG (GERMANY F R)
|
| The author provides a viewpoint concerning whether the nation-state has a future, using Germany as a model. Some say no, in light of supranationalist organizations such as the European Union; others say there will be a nationalist backlash. The author looks at German history, seeing the roots of Hitler's destructive tendencies going back to Frederick the Great and the Prussian tradition. Germany played a secondary ... |
|
| Die Neue Bundeswehr (The New Army) |
AUG 1998 |
|
| Authors:
Heiko Biehl; SOZIALWISSENSCHAFTLICHES INST DER BUNDESWEHR STRAUSBERG (GERMANY)
|
| The study concerns the paths and problems of the adaptation of the German Armed Forces to the extenuating challenges of national security following the end of the Cold War. The author prefaces the mentioning of the "new army,' by discussing the changes that occurred during 1989-1991, and how they might have affected Germany military attitudes. The New Army is then thoroughly analyzed in terms of structure, political handicaps, multinational links, ... |
|
| Command and Control of the First Modern Campaign; The German Invasion ofDenmark and Norway - April, 1940 |
05 MAY 1998 |
36 pages |
| Authors:
Robert W. Strahan; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT
|
| The German invasion of Norway and Denmark in April, 1940, was the first example of a modern campaign with integrated land, air and navy forces. The invasion was successfully executed without distracting forces from the pending invasion of Western Europe in May. It was also conducted in an environment of British naval superiority. The paper focuses on the command and control relationships established by the ... |
|
| Die Reform von Streitkraeften - Grundsaetze und Methoden (The Reform of the Armed Forces: Principles and Methods) |
DEC 1997 |
28 pages |
| Authors:
Juergen Schnell; UNIVERSITAET DER BUNDESWEHR MUENCHEN NEUBIBERG (GERMANY) INST FUER VOLKSWIRTSCHAFTSLEHRE
|
| Most of the data is culled from the author's tenure in the military leadership from 1987 to 1995, during which time he witness the reforms spurred by the end of the Cold War and German Reunification. The study is then divided in the following manner: firstly, the armed forces as a system of general ordering principles; secondly, the armed forces' relationship to ecological trends; thirdly, the basic principles of military ... |
|
| Joint Operations Case Study. Weseruebung Nord: Germany's Invasion of Norway, 1940 |
MAR 1997 |
62 pages |
| Authors:
Timothy F. Lindermann; AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLL MAXWELL AFB AL
|
| In the history of modern warfare, Weseruebung Nord, the German invasion of Norway in 1940, occupies a distinguished station as the first campaign "jointly" planned and executed by ground, sea, and air forces. This paper examines the origins, concept, and planning of Weseruebung Nord, as well as the execution of the landings. Brief attention is given to the defense of the landings against Allied counterstrokes and to issues associated with ... |
|
| Neville Chamberlain and the Policy of Appeasement |
1996 |
16 pages |
| Authors:
Jon L. Lellenberg; NATIONAL WAR COLL WASHINGTON DC
|
| Neville Chamberlain is usually remembered today as a weak man feebly clutching an umbrella, trying to satisfy Hitler's voracious appetite so England will be let alone. World War II made appeasement, and its crowning diplomatic event, the 1938 Munich conference, synonyms for sacrificing the interests of others in futile attempts to placate dictators. This view of appeasement and of Munich influenced several generations of American Cold War diplomats and strategists, ... |
|
| Operation WESERUEBUNG: Valuable Lessons in Joint Warfare |
08 FEB 94 |
34 pages |
| Authors:
Monte R. Hill; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI DEPT OF OPERATIONS
|
| The German invasion of Norway and Denmark in April of 1940, was code named Operation Weseruebung. Although this campaign is not well known as other campaigns of World War II, it does hold a special significance for students of modern military operations. It was during this campaign that the first joint operations to involve significant land, sea, and air forces, fighting under a unified command, were conducted. The purpose of ... |
|
| The Influence of Technology on the Theory of Warfare: Clausewitz Revises "On War" After the Battle of Britain |
1994 |
13 pages |
| Authors:
Jr Wills Lynn R.; NATIONAL WAR COLL WASHINGTON DC
|
| According to Carl von Clausewitz, "...in modern war one will search in vain for a battle in which the winning side triumphed over an army twice its size." Yet, throughout the summer and early fall of 1940, the Royal Air Force (RAF) fought the Battle of Britain against a German Luftwaffe that enjoyed at least a 4-to-1 numerical advantage. The bravery of the RAF pilots notwithstanding, the battle was decided ... |
|
| An Examination of the 1917-1918 U-Boat Campaign in Light of B. H. Liddell Hart's Theories of Indirect Approach |
1994 |
13 pages |
| Authors:
II Hamilton C. S.; NATIONAL WAR COLL WASHINGTON DC
|
| One of the most prolific critics of military strategy following World War I, Basil Henry Liddell Hart sought alternatives to the Western Front's mechanics of mass slaughter that yielded neither decisive tactical success nor attainment of strategic military objectives and, hence, denied achievement of national objectives. Inspired by Sun Tzu's concept of the cheng (direct) and ch'i (indirect) forces, Liddell Hart developed a theory of strategy of the indirect approach, ... |
|
| Intelligence Lessons Learned from the Battle for Crete, May 1941 |
19 JUN 92 |
36 pages |
| Authors:
Miriam F. Perlberg; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI DEPT OF OPERATIONS
|
| Ultra intelligence derived from decryption of high-level German military communications nets provided the Allied forces defending Crete with extraordinary warning of the impending German air assault in May 1941. Despite the advantage of this warning, the Allies' defense of Crete was unsuccessful. Examination of the preparations for the battle and of the available intelligence reveals shortcomings in the linkage between intelligence and operations which reduced the battlefield commander's ability to ... |
|
| Franco-German Defense Cooperation: Outlook and Implications |
91 |
|
| Authors:
William Boisseree; ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA
|
| Postwar military cooperation between France and Germany dates from the late 1950's, when the two began to pursue joint weapons development and armaments production. The current state of intensified defense cooperation began in 1982, when French President Mitterrand and West German Chancellor Schmidt agreed to conduct through exchanges of views on security problems. This led to the October 1982 decision to implement the defense clauses of the 1963 Elysee Treaty ... |
|
| German Unification: Security Implications for Europe |
01 JUL 90 |
226 pages |
| Authors:
Salvatore M. Bruni; ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA
|
| A divided Germany has been the centerpiece of European security relations for the past 45 years. With Europe in turmoil over the implosion of the Soviet Union, the revolutions rushing through Eastern Europe, and impending European economic integration, the current security architecture is teetering. This study begins with a brief explanation of the theory of alliances and why nation states seek them. The chapter ends with a brief look into ... |
|
| Berlin Airlift |
MAY 90 |
54 pages |
| Authors:
Adbul A. Shokair; AIR WAR COLL MAXWELL AFB AL
|
| The Anglo-American airlift to supply Berlin when it was deprived of surface transportation in June 1948 was a dramatic undertaking. The closing of the roads, railroads, and canals into the city by Russians was a siege which, if successful, would have compelled the surrender of the German capital to Communists to prevent the starvation of the populace. The airlift broke the siege, something that had never before been accomplished by ... |
|
| Follow-On Force Attack -- Now and In the Future |
APR 90 |
35 pages |
| Authors:
Avb Hawken; AIR WAR COLL MAXWELL AFB AL
|
| Soviet military doctrine calls for the use of echeloning to penetrate prepared defenses. FOFA counters this strategy by reducing the combat power of the follow-on forces to produce manageable force ratios at the in-contact battle. The FOFA concept offers a framework within which to employ new technology systems to locate, delay, disrupt and destroy targets in the enemy rear. From inception, FOFA has been controversial but since its formal adoption ... |
|
| One Germany - A New Soviet Strategy? |
12 MAR 90 |
|
| Authors:
Robert B. Clarke; ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA
|
| The course of post-World War II history has marched us defiantly towards the dramatic, perhaps traumatic series of events which unfold almost daily before our disbelieving eyes. Seemingly hard-line communist countries, even in the Soviet Union itself, are showing the signs of strain-cracks in the thin veneer of totalitarianism. Such tremendous and unanticipated change cannot help but resurrect a whole host of unsettled issues, many of which have lain buried ... |
|
| The Unknown Generals - German Corps Commanders in World War II |
03 JUN 88 |
|
| Authors:
French L. Maclean; ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS
|
| This thesis is an historical analysis of the background and demonstrated leadership attributes of 332 World War II German corps commanders on the Eastern, Italian, and Western Fronts. Overall characteristics are determined based on each officer's experience and performance based on available historical records. These records focus on age, nobility, background, education branch, previous command and staff positions, membership in the General Staff, demonstrated military achievement, promotion, and subsequent higher ... |
|
| Search for Deployment Theory: The German Campaign in Norway, April 1940 |
26 APR 88 |
|
| Authors:
Nathan J. Power; ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MIL ITARY STUDIES
|
| This monograph discusses the implications of deployment theory in planning deployment operations at the strategic and operational levels of war. It proposes that there are tenets of deployment planning that are interrelated with the principles of war. The tenets for deployment operations are deception, agility, dispersion, and synchronization. They are interrelated with the principles of war of surprise, security, objective, economy of force and unity of command. The monograph examines ... |
|
| Mesoscale Wind Variability in the Vicinity of Berlin, Germany |
JAN 87 |
|
| Authors:
Larry Levitt; Oskar M. Essenwanger; ARMY MISSILE COMMAND REDSTONE ARSENAL AL RESEARCH DIRECTORATE
|
| Mesoscale wind variability over a 35 mile (56 km) distance in the vicinity of Berlin, Germany is discussed in this report. Horizontal differences in windspeed (scalar shear) and wind direction (angular differences) are utilized to compute the deviation of the windspeed and direction (wind-shear) from one measurement location to another at the constant pressure levels: Surface, 1000 mb (near surface), 850 mb (1.5 km), 700 mb (3 km), and 500 ... |
|
| Soviet Defensive Tactics at Kursk, July 1943 |
Sep-1986 |
73 pages |
| Authors:
David M Glantz; ARMY COMBINED ARMS CENTER FORT LEAVENWORTH KS SOVIET ARMY STUDIES OFFICE
|
| In his classic work, On War, Carl von Clausewitz wrote, As we shall show, defense is a stronger farm of fighting than attack. A generation of 19th century officers, nurtured on the study of the experiences of Napoleon and conditioned by the wars of German unification, had little reason to accept that view. The offensive spirit swept through European armies and manifested itself in the regulations, plans, and mentality of ... |
|
| The Strategic Air War Against Germany and Japan: A Memoir |
1986 |
324 pages |
| Authors:
Haywood S. Hansell Jr; OFFICE OF AIR FORCE HISTORY WASHINGTONDC
|
|
| Ansback AHP, Germany Limited Surface Observations Climatic Summary (LISOCS) |
SEP 1984 |
|
| Authors:
AIR FORCE ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNICAL APPLICATIONS CENTER SCOTT AFB IL
|
| This report is similar to a Revised Uniform Summary of Surface Weather Observations (RUSSWO) except the summary generated is from data observed at limited-duty observation sites. This summary is blocked based on the normal hours of observation and only those tables using hourly data are presented. Caution must be exercised when using these summaries as the data reflect conditions occurring only during limited duty hours of operation. This report is ... |
|
| Zweibrucken AB, Germany Revised Uniform Summary of Surface Weather Observations (RUSSWO). Parts A-F |
AUG 1984 |
|
| Authors:
AIR FORCE ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNICAL APPLICATIONS CENTER SCOTT AFB IL
|
| This report is a six part statistical summary of surface weather observations for Zweibrucken AFB, Germany. It contains the following parts: (A) Weather conditions; Atmospheric phenomena; (B)Precipitation, Snowfall and Snow Depth (daily amounts and extreme values); (C)Surface winds; (D)Ceiling versus visibility; sky cover; (E)Psychrometric Summaries (daily maximum and minimum temperatures, extreme maximum and minimum temperatures, psychrometric summary of wet-bulb temperature depression versus dry-bulb temperature, means and standard deviations of dry-bulb, ... |
|
| Hohenfels AAF, Germany Limited Surface Observations Climatic Summary (LISOCS) |
AUG 1984 |
|
| Authors:
AIR FORCE ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNICAL APPLICATIONS CENTER SCOTT AFB IL
|
| This report is similar to a Revised Uniform Summary of Surface Weather Observations (RUSSWO) except the summary generated is from data observed at limited-duty observation sites. This summary is blocked based on the normal hours of observation and only those tables using hourly data are presented. Caution must be exercised when using these summaries as the data reflect conditions occurring only during limited duty hours of operation. This report is ... |
|
| Spangdahlem AB, Germany Revised Uniform Summary of Surface Weather Observations (RUSSWO). Parts A-F |
AUG 1984 |
|
| Authors:
AIR FORCE ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNICAL APPLICATIONS CENTER SCOTT AFB IL
|
| This report is a six part statistical summary of surface weather observations for Spangdahlem AB, Germany It contains the following parts: (A) weather conditions; Atmospheric phenomena; (B)Precipitation, Snowfall and Snow Depth (daily amounts and extreme values); (C)Surface winds; (D)Ceiling versus visibility; sky cover; (E)Psychrometric Summaries (daily maximum and minimum temperatures, extreme maximum and minimum temperatures, psychrometric summary of wet-bulb temperature depression versus dry-bulb temperature, means and standard deviations of dry-bulb, ... |
|
| Roer River Crossing Conducted by the Ninth U.S. Army, XIII U.S. Corps, and the 84th Infantry Division, 23 February 1945: Offensive, Deliberate Assault, River Crossing |
22 JUN 84 |
|
| Authors:
H. K. Reamey; F. D. Clervi; B. A. R. Yusof; R. A. Ashey; J. M. Bosley; ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS COMBAT STUDIES INST
|
| Operation Grenade was the Ninth U.S. Army's crossing of the Roer River in February 1945. This study focuses on the 84th Infantry Division which was the northernmost division in the operation. On 23 February 1945, the 84th Division crossed the Roer River in assault boats on a one battalion front. The 84th quickly advanced inland after the successful crossing. The crossing of the Roer River is a classic example of ... |
|
| Aachen: Offensive, Deliberate Attack, MOUT (Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain), 13 September-21 October 1944 |
23 MAY 84 |
151 pages |
| Authors:
R. E. Price III; R. D. Barrett; F. C. Davis III; J. DeZonia; J. Eatherly; ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS COMBAT STUDIES INST
|
| During September 1944 the first US Army made the deepest penetration of the West Wall in the vicinity of AACHEN. German intent was to prevent further penetration into Germany by Allied forces. US forces encircled the town of AACHEN and repulsed German counterattacks. House-to-house fighting ensued with heavy use of artillery against entrenched enemy positions. This battle is an excellent example of military operations in built-up/urban terrain. (Author) |
|
| Remagen Bridgehead, Offensive, Hasty Assault, River Crossing |
23 MAY 84 |
|
| Authors:
Myron Oyloe; Charles Donnell; Richard Gilmore; William Hagan; Rick Hardie; ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS COMBAT STUDIES INST
|
| On 7 March 1945, a task force from the US 9th Armored Division discovered the Ludendorff Bridge at Remagen still standing. It was the only Rhine River bridge not demolished by the Germans. Taking a gamble, the leading elements of the task force attacked the bridge, raced across and established a bridgehead on the east bank. The bridgehead was rapidly reinforced and expanded drawing units from other parts of the ... |
|
| Battle Analysis: The Saar River Crossing |
22 MAY 84 |
|
| Authors:
Behzat Bilgic; Felix Banis; James Crawford; Thomas Ellis; Stanley Evans; ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS COMBAT STUDIES INST
|
| At 0630 hours 22 February 1945, the 301st and 302nd Inf Regiments of the 94th Inf Div conducted a hasty river crossing across the Saar River between Taben and Stadt under the cover of smoke. By 24 February 1945, both regiments had crossed and secured a bridgehead one and a half miles deep, allowing for the rapid crossing of tanks, tank destroyers, and motor vehicles over a single treadway bridge ... |
|
| Huertgen Forest: Offensive, Deliberate Attack, Forest, 16 November 1944 |
MAY 84 |
131 pages |
| Authors:
S. Snow; F. Alajeel; G. Campbell; J. Erb; M. Harrison; ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS COMBAT STUDIES INST
|
| The VII (US) Corps, 1st Army attacked 16 November 1944 with 1st Inf Div, 4th Inf Div, 104th Inf Div, and CCR 5th AD to clear Huertgen Forest and the path of 1st Army to the Roer River. After heavy fighting, primarily by the 4th Infantry Division, VII Corps' attack ground to a halt. V Corps was committed on 21 November 1944. Attacking with 8th Inf Div, and CCR 5th ... |
|
Reports by Keyword(s)
*GERMANY_EAST AND WEST_
