| Joint Task Force - Port Opening: Can this Emerging Capability Expedite Operational Objectives Throughout the Range of Military Operations? |
26 Oct 2009 |
27 pages |
| Authors:
Michael W Pratt; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT
|
 | With the U.S. Military shifting from a defend in place mindset to that of an expeditionary combat force, the need for a rapid port opening capability and efficient distribution network has never been greater. JTF-PO is an emerging capability under operational control of USTRANSCOM with the ability to provide a joint enabling force capable of rapidly deploying anywhere in the world to quickly establish, and initially operate, an aerial port ... |
|
| Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Kosovo: An Exit Strategy |
23 Oct 2009 |
27 pages |
| Authors:
Michael D Borg; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT
|
| Even as the NATO Secretary General alluded to the possible withdrawal of forces from Kosovo, critics are clamoring that no clear exit strategy exists. The unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo in February 2008 puts this new nation at the crossroads and is a game changer for NATO. For the past ten years NATO, through KFOR, established a safe and secure environment within the country. Kosovo must evolve as a ... |
|
| The Strait of Malacca Formula: Success in Counter-Piracy and Its Applicability to the Gulf of Aden |
23 Oct 2009 |
27 pages |
| Authors:
Jamiola; Donald R Jr; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT
|
| Piracy is increasing at an alarming rate in the Gulf of Aden and off the Somali coast. Piracy in the Strait of Malacca region once ran rampant, but has steadily declined since 2003. It seems useful to apply the counter-piracy tactics used in this region to the Gulf of Aden area to attempt a decline in pirate attacks. An attempt to apply the counter-piracy tactics used in the Malacca region ... |
|
| Small Teams, Large Effects: Special Operations Forces and the Employment of Operational Fires |
23 Oct 2009 |
25 pages |
| Authors:
Eric Venema; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT
|
| The planning and synchronization of joint operational fires with other operational functions is critical to mission success. Operational fires are normally the task of conventional forces, but historical analysis indicates that special operations forces (SOF) have conducted operational fires with great success. In these instances, there were several overarching conditions that drove the Joint Force Commander (JFC) to choose a SOF option to conduct these fires. Historically, these conditions were ... |
|
| Combat Literacy: Creating a Command Climate With Greater Appreciation for the Operational Role of Foreign Language |
23 Oct 2009 |
30 pages |
| Authors:
Alfred R Magleby; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT
|
| Success in contemporary warfare is as dependent upon life-giving information as it is on lethal firepower. Understanding the language and culture of the battle space is critical to effective operational design. Analysis of steps taken by the U.S. military to provide the linguistic means to pursue operational and strategic ends indicates that programmatic solutions are favored, although a proper assessment of the requirement highlights the need for a shift in ... |
|
| Intelligence Failure: How a Commander Can Prevent It |
23 Oct 2009 |
26 pages |
| Authors:
Rob A Dahlin; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT
|
| Intelligence Failure: How a Commander Can Prevent It The job of intelligence is to provide the decision maker with sufficient understanding of the enemy to make the correct decisions on how, where and when to utilize friendly forces to accomplish the mission. To do this, the Intelligence Officer (J2) employs the intelligence process to bring the power of the intelligence community to bear in support of the commander's requirements. During ... |
|
| Planning for Peace: Rethinking the Combatant Commander's Role in the Post-Conflict |
23 Oct 2009 |
31 pages |
| Authors:
Christopher J Parkhurst; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT
|
| In light of the significant challenges in Iraq and Afghanistan, contemporary discourse has rightly focused on civil-military affairs and is rife with calls for a ?whole-of-government? approach that would provide greater capacity to other instruments of national power while better defining the military's role in post-conflict activities. United States Government decision makers have resisted the pursuit of sweeping changes to the structure and resourcing of the interagency to effectively plan ... |
|
| Go Forth and Multiply: How the Chaplain's Actions can Have Strategic Impact in the Current Operational Environment |
23 Oct 2009 |
29 pages |
| Authors:
Stephen P Pike; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT
|
| While the main body of the chaplain's work has not changed over time there have been a number of recent factors that have impacted his or her role and mission. These dynamics have now more than ever necessitated that the operational commander provides clear guidance through the Joint Force Chaplain to the area chaplains. The guidance should clearly delineate and restrict those activities that could negatively impact the mission. Such ... |
|
| UN Peacekeeping Doctrine and Its Implications for Future US Operations |
23 Oct 2009 |
27 pages |
| Authors:
Laura A Potter; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT
|
| The United Nations recently achieved the milestone of 60 years of peacekeeping operations since the establishment of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in the Middle East in 1948. During the past 60 years the UN has seen its peacekeeping missions rise in number and complexity and has witnessed a shift from traditional state-on-state challenges to much more complex internal struggles, often involving non-state actors. Analysis of the 2008 ... |
|
| The Challenge for the Modern Day Operational Leader: Succeeding in the Realm of Civilian Organizations |
23 Oct 2009 |
26 pages |
| Authors:
Douglas R Schueler; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT
|
| Interactions with a multitude of civilian government and non-government organizations are certain to be part of future military operations. The major challenge for the military leader at the operational level of war will not necessarily be in how he leads the military organization under his charge but in the requirement to cooperate and coordinate with other governmental agencies (OGAs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and selected elements of the ... |
|
| Where and How Must JOPP Change to Meet the Challenges of the 21st Century Operating Environment? |
23 Oct 2009 |
25 pages |
| Authors:
James Stopa; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT
|
| As a foundational methodology, the Joint Operations Planning Process (JOPP) remains relevant but is in great need of refinements for US military efforts to be more effective in complex operating environments. One of the most critical aspects missing in the JOPP is the element of problem framing. This effort not only supports initial planning, but is also critical in the follow-on assessment role. Additionally, the dynamics of irregular warfare through ... |
|
| Exposure and Experience: Additional Criteria for Selecting Future Operational Theater Commanders |
23 Oct 2009 |
26 pages |
| Authors:
Christopher J Williams; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT
|
| Creating a synergy of effort amongst the nearly innumerable agencies involved in a contingency operation is one of the challenges of the operational theater commander, which makes his selection an essential element of mission success within a theater of operations. This paper argues that because of the rare opportunities that exist to command at the operational theater-level of war, exposure to those serving in operational positions should be maximized prior ... |
|
| Who Should Have the Hammer? Leadership of SSTR Planning and Operations |
23 Oct 2009 |
24 pages |
| Authors:
Byron B Anderson; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT
|
| It is easy to point fingers when it comes to our collective shortfalls in Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) planning and execution. Recent attempts at refining direction and organization have gone a long way towards developing constructs to achieve better unity of effort across USG entities, specifically the Departments of State and Defense. However, shortfalls remain in U.S. ability to plan and execute SSTR operations as dictated. This paper ... |
|
| The Arctic: One Region, One Commander |
23 Oct 2009 |
27 pages |
| Authors:
William P Hayes; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT
|
| With the release of its new Arctic Region Policy (ARP), the US has taken its first steps toward engaging in the Arctic in a comprehensive way. This paper examines the current US Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) construct in the Arctic, including its command and control (C2) structure and physical and geopolitical seams, and suggests how it could be better structured to support US strategic objectives in the Arctic and the ... |
|
| United States Military in Central Asia: Beyond Operation Enduring Freedom |
23 Oct 2009 |
24 pages |
| Authors:
Lane; Harry J Jr; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT
|
| U.S. interests in Central Asia are far-reaching and varied. The arguments, both for and against a post Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) U.S. military presence in Central Asia are equally diverse. Publicly, the United States claims it has no plans to maintain long-term basing in Central Asia. Yet, the longer the conflict in Afghanistan rages on, the harder it will be to make the case to significantly draw down or eliminate ... |
|
| Somali Piracy: Are We Making a Mountain Out of a Molehill? |
23 Oct 2009 |
39 pages |
| Authors:
Timothy E Newsome; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT
|
| Piracy off the coast of Somalia has increased in frequency over the years but the world had paid scant attention until the September 2008 capture of the MV Faina, a Ukrainian freighter with 33 refurbished Russian-made T-72 tanks and millions of dollars worth of other military equipment. In November 2008, the pirates once again surprised the world when they captured the MV Sirius Star, a supertanker with 2 billion barrels ... |
|
| Hybrid Orgs for Hybrid Wars: The Story of AFRICOM's New Hybrid and Why Other CCDRs Should Want One, Too |
23 Oct 2009 |
26 pages |
| Authors:
JohnDavid W Willis; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT
|
| When U.S. Africa Command was established in 2008, its manning and organizational structure looked very different from that of most other geographic combatant commands. USAFRICOM's key staff structure contained numerous interagency manpower positions, to include a State Department Ambassador as one of two Deputy Commanders. This was due to the advent of hybrid security challenges, for which the U.S. Government had found itself inadequately prepared. A host of alternative recommendations ... |
|
| How to Fail at Post-Hostilities Planning at the Operational Level |
23 Oct 2009 |
24 pages |
| Authors:
Scott D Chowning; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT
|
| Combatant commander leadership is THE critical factor in ensuring robust, operational planning is done for post-hostilities (Phase IV). This can be seen by looking at the Phase IV failures in both Panama and Iraq. Both these Phase IV planning failures followed successful combat operations in Phase III, but the combatant commanders failed to ensure as much effort was put into Phase IV planning as Phase III. In fact, they failed ... |
|
| Cyberwarfare and Our Allies: The Importance of Theater Security Cooperation |
23 Oct 2009 |
23 pages |
| Authors:
Christopher V Greene; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT
|
| The cyber attacks on the countries of Estonia and Georgia have galvanized the realization that state and non-state actors will exploit vulnerabilities in the information environment to influence national leadership and their critical command and control capabilities. This has serious implications across the globe, and specifically within the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) area of operations. Russia's future use, either state sponsored or through proxies, of cyber attacks to influence NATO ... |
|
| Humanitarian Assistance: An Opportunity Is Lost |
23 Oct 2009 |
27 pages |
| Authors:
William P LaChance; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT
|
| The literature is replete with inspiring stories of successful humanitarian missions (HA). The missions alleviate pain and sufferings, and if only in the short term, better the community they serve; but do these missions fully support the geographic combatant commander's (GCC) theater security cooperation plans (TSCP)? An objective analysis indicates the United States' humanitarian assistance programs lack strategic vision, effective interagency coordination, adequate funding, and responsiveness; and therefore, do not ... |
|
| Climate Change, Instability and a Full Spectrum Approach to Conflict Prevention in Africa |
23 Oct 2009 |
31 pages |
| Authors:
Shawn T Bailey; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT
|
| Climate change is an emerging threat to the national security of the United States. It has the potential to enhance the underlying causes of failed and failing states in Africa resulting in an increased frequency of crisis response operations, taxing the armed forces already engaged in conflicts around the globe. If climate change is the catalyst of crises to come, Africa Command (AFRICOM) must employ innovative and proactive cooperative theater ... |
|
| Computer Network Operations Command and Control: A New Perspective |
22 Oct 2009 |
29 pages |
| Authors:
Shane M Connary; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT
|
| The 2009 Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report states Experience from recent operations and global cyberspace incidents underscore the critical role cyberspace capabilities play in preventing conflict when possible, and supporting full-spectrum military operations when necessary...Our national security is inextricably linked to the cyberspace domain, where conflict is not limited by geography or time. The standup of United States Cyber Command in September 2009 was a milestone in cyberspace command ... |
|
| Assessing USJFCOM's Role on Joint Doctrine Development--An EBO Case Study |
01-Jun-2009 |
30 pages |
| Authors:
Jason W Evenson; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT
|
| On 14 August, 2008, General Mattis, Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) directed his command that, Effective immediately, USJFCOM will no longer use, sponsor or export the terms and concepts related to Effects Based Operations (EBO)...in our training, doctrine development and support of JPME (Joint Professional Military Education). His statement exposed a flaw in joint doctrine that the development process is broken. With the stroke of a pen, Mattis effectively ... |
|
| Coercive Naval Diplomacy |
14-May-2009 |
24 pages |
| Authors:
Matthew Scarlett; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT
|
| Throughout history, naval forces played a prominent role in supporting foreign policy objectives. Navies can support political objectives through cooperative diplomacy and the use of soft power, or they can support them through coercive naval diplomacy, often referred to as gunboat diplomacy. Although in recent years, the United States Navy is increasingly focusing on the role of soft power in the prevention of war; coercive diplomacy is still an effective ... |
|
| A Cognitive Approach to COIN: Countering Dangerous Beliefs |
13-May-2009 |
31 pages |
| Authors:
Jeffrey A McNeil; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT
|
| Counterinsurgency doctrine for targeting host nation popular support lacks a coherent underlying theoretical structure, and this void can result in unfocused and ineffective counterinsurgency planning. The dangerous beliefs model for counterinsurgency can provide a flexible framework to augment current counterinsurgency doctrine. The proposed model can serve as a guide for educating counterinsurgency forces to plan and conduct operations and understand the implications of their actions to gain popular support. While ... |
|
| The U.S. Army's Design Doctrine: A Solution to the Ills of the Operations Planning Processes |
05-May-2009 |
21 pages |
| Authors:
Wilburn B McLamb; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT
|
| As the U.S. military reflects on recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the realization the current operations planning process needs some adjusting is evident. The current operations planning process has proven to be slow to orient to the true nature of these conflicts, slow to gain a better understanding of the operational environment, and slow to adapt to change. Furthermore, these complex, adaptive environments place an increased need for whole ... |
|
| Design: The Future of Planning? |
04-May-2009 |
24 pages |
| Authors:
Michael F Minaudo; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT
|
| The complexity of warfare in the 21st century has significantly evolved. The wicked problems that military planners face has forced the military to reexamine the practices that are used in developing solutions to these challenges. Army Field Manual (I) 5-2, Design, dated 20 February 2009 was developed to assist military planners in these endeavors. According to the Manual,design is an approach to critical and creative thinking that enables a commander ... |
|
| An AK, Three Clips, and a Koran: Deciphering Al Qaeda's Principles of War |
04-May-2009 |
23 pages |
| Authors:
William J Fry; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT
|
| Many papers and reports have been written on Al Qaeda and the western principles of war. Government agencies and universities throughout the world work hard to analyze the background of Al Qaeda to better understand the organization and where its next strike might occur. At the same time, theorists and academics debate whether the principles of war debated since the time of Clausewitz still apply to the modern battles that ... |
|
| Reconstruction and Stability Operations: Lead, Follow, or Get Out of the Way |
04-May-2009 |
27 pages |
| Authors:
Richard C Hubbard; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT
|
| The 7 December 2005 National Security Presidential Directive designated the Department of State (DOS) to be the lead agency for coordinating, synchronizing and conducting Reconstruction and Stabilization (R&S) operations clearly identifies the United States Government interest in transitioning operations to assist the Afghanistan central government in securing its country in order to develop long-term stability and order. For the interim, however, the sole cabinet level organization that possesses the ability ... |
|
| Operational Leadership and Advancing Technology |
04-May-2009 |
21 pages |
| Authors:
Rodney R LeMay; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT
|
| Technology is advancing at an ever increasing rate in the 21st century. Many of these advances have been incorporated into the military. The latest gadgets are often bought from commercial vendors; the so called, off the shelf solution. Although this often provides a short term benefit, often too little analysis is conducted on to best integrate the technology into the way we fight. This paper uses a case study of ... |
|
| Go/ No-Go Criteria for the JFC in Counterinsurgency Operations |
04-May-2009 |
20 pages |
| Authors:
George M Lowe; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT
|
| In determining whether or not the U.S. government should engage in counterinsurgency operations with military support, the Joint Force Commander should evaluate four criteria before committing forces. The first is an attainable agreed upon desired end state. The second is the host nation's willingness to address the grievances of the population. The third is the host nation's ability to provide security for the population. The fourth is the host nation's ... |
|
| Forcible Entry From the Sea: Operational Commanders Tools and Techniques for Execution in Today's Environment |
04-May-2009 |
24 pages |
| Authors:
Scott Gehris; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT
|
| An opposed Amphibious Assault capability provides the operational commander with options that are not achievable with other service capabilities. The operational commander achieves deterrence, quick response and flexibility with a forcible entry capability. This paper utilizes past forcible entry case studies to illustrate operational functions that led to successful operations. It will analyze current amphibious platforms, supporting assets and technology to illustrate weaknesses and strengths in the current capabilities. The ... |
|
| Effects-based Operations - A Valid Concept for Operations in an Anti-access Environment |
04-May-2009 |
22 pages |
| Authors:
Eric D Hresko; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT
|
| In his recent article entitled USJFCOM Commander's Guidance for Effects-based Operations, Gen James Mattis states, Effective immediately, USJFCOM will no longer use, sponsor, or export the terms and concepts related to EBO, ONA and SoSA in our training, doctrine development, and support of JPME. This pronouncement has supposedly halted the use of effects-based operations (EBO) within the Department of Defense (DOD), despite the fact that EBO has had success in ... |
|
| Operations to Defeat Iranian Maritime Trade Interdiction |
04-May-2009 |
28 pages |
| Authors:
Colin K Boynton; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT
|
| The Strait of Hormuz is vital to global economic stability due to the massive amounts of petroleum that are produced in the Arabian Gulf and only transportable by tanker. Iran has repeatedly threatened to close the Strait to traffic if provoked. The confined littoral battle space of the Strait is an extremely difficult tactical environment for the U.S. Navy. This paper examines the factors of time, space and force with ... |
|
| Integrating Intelligence and Information Sharing in Theater Security Cooperation |
04-May-2009 |
29 pages |
| Authors:
Robert T Flickinger; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT
|
| Theater Security Cooperation plans and activities are essential in developing capable coalition partners that work with the United States to maintain regional stability and counter common threats. A critical component of Theater Security Cooperation planning is intelligence and information sharing. This paper explores how Operational Function Intelligence should be integrated into Theater Security Cooperation and campaign planning in order to most effectively support the Geographic Combatant Commander. It begins with ... |
|
| Provincial Reconstruction Teams: The Compelling Need for Joint Doctrine |
04-May-2009 |
23 pages |
| Authors:
William D Fraser; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT
|
| Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) have been operating in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility for nearly six years. Their efforts play a tremendous role in improving security, stability, transition and reconstruction operations and they continue to prove their value to commanders as effective units driving positive change for the future of both Iraq and Afghanistan. Currently, there is no established doctrine to guide PRTs in training, planning, preparing, and ... |
|
| The Proliferation Security Initiative: A Means to an End for the Operational Commander |
04-May-2009 |
30 pages |
| Authors:
Curtis G Larson; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT
|
| Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) proliferation is a serious threat to the security of the United States and the world. For the operational commander supporting national strategy the interdiction of WMD materials is a complex mission that requires the capability to exchange timely information with coalition nations as well as conduct multi-national operations with partners with differing constraints and capacities. Current doctrine does not provide the operational commander the fundamental ... |
|
| Knowledge Management: An Effort to Keep Pace with Information |
04-May-2009 |
31 pages |
| Authors:
Darryl B Martin; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT
|
| In a network centric environment, a multitude of platforms and communication systems will be linked to provide all levels of command with near real-time data to feed their decision-making cycles. The ability to cope with this abundance of information will depend on the organization's ability to adapt and learn faster than the enemy. To aid this accelerated learning process, knowledge management (KM) allows for the capture and exchange of experiences ... |
|
| Persistent Airpower for Unconventional Warfare: Revamping AFCENT's Operational Design |
04-May-2009 |
26 pages |
| Authors:
Lee G Gentile; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT
|
| The recent presidential decision to end U.S. combat operations in Iraq in August 2010 moves Operation Iraqi Freedom from stability operations to enabling Iraqi civil authority. However, even though the Iraqi Army will assume responsibility for defense, the Iraqi Air Force is not ready to assume control of air operations. Consequently, the U.S. will be required to provide the Iraqi Army and U.S. advisors with air support. Yet, why must ... |
|
| The Supported Commander in High Intensity Anti-Access Maritime Conflict |
04-May-2009 |
25 pages |
| Authors:
Nick O Guttman; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT
|
| Both U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy service doctrines take a parochial and dogmatic approach to joint operations in the maritime environment, with both services claiming their service or associated functional component should earn the title supported commander. However, when measured against the backdrop of maritime conflict with a near-peer adversary conducting high intensity anti-access warfare, both services? beliefs lose legitimacy. This paper argues that to best leverage joint force ... |
|
| Defense Support to Public Diplomacy: Options for the Operational Commander |
04-May-2009 |
24 pages |
| Authors:
Matthew F Harmon; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT
|
| With the end of the Cold War came a uni-polar world in which the United States stood alone as the sole super power. One of the major fallouts of the perceived peace dividend created by the new world order was the thought that the U.S. government no longer needed to actively communicate with the nations of the world. The primary agency tasked with communicating outside the United States, the U.S. ... |
|
| Optimizing the Naval Force for the Horn of Africa Anti-Piracy Mission |
04-May-2009 |
23 pages |
| Authors:
Jarrett; Michael R Jr; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT
|
| Coalition forces have patrolled the waters of the Horn of Africa (HOA) in a concerted effort to maintain maritime domain awareness in the region for nearly a decade. In spite of this presence, piracy actions rose to a record level in 2008 and increased at an alarming rate. In the context of a continued naval presence in the waters of the HOA, this paper analyzes how our navies are being ... |
|
| Don't Forget the Cyber! Why the Joint Force Commander Must Integrate Cyber Operations Across Other War Fighting Domains, and How a Joint Forces Cyberspace Component Commander Will Help |
04-May-2009 |
31 pages |
| Authors:
Martin Stallone; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT
|
| Amidst a geometric increase in the interconnectedness of our world, the official Department of Defense definition calls cyberspace a global domain in which all military departments and combatant commands need to operate unimpeded. Despite the operational implications of this statement, there is little published research about how the current Unified Command Plan affects the integration of cyber operations with actions in other domains in the geographic commands. This paper finds ... |
|
| Closing the Gap between the Department of State and U. S. Military Operations during Post-War Conflict |
04-May-2009 |
23 pages |
| Authors:
Von; Charlie R Bergen; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT
|
| During current and recent U. S. military operations there has not been a seamless transition from phase III (Dominate) to phase IV (Stabilize). This paper argues the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization should permanently assign a team of reconstruction and stabilization experts to the Ground Component Commander within a combatant command. It discusses current interagency cooperation, the importance of the planning process and current initiatives the State ... |
|
| General Lucius D. Clay: Operational Leadership in a Post-Combat Environment |
04-May-2009 |
23 pages |
| Authors:
Andrew J Sullivan; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT
|
| The current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have reinforced the importance of Phase IV stability operations. A vital aspect to successfully conducting post-combat operations is effective operational leadership. To further consider the importance of leadership, a case study of General Lucius D. Clay leadership during the American occupation of Germany following World War II is presented. This paper establishes a theoretical framework by discussing key terms and concepts, to include ... |
|
| Targeted Killings: A Legally Viable, High Risk Course of Action |
04-May-2009 |
24 pages |
| Authors:
David C Terry; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT
|
| On 11 December 2005, the Israeli Supreme Court ruled that targeted killings were not strictly prohibited under international law. Analysis of the court case and supporting documents will illustrate that the position taken by the court is sound in it's legal judgment and provides the U.S. military and other militaries with a powerful tool. Analysis of centers of gravity on the middle to lower end of the range of military ... |
|
| Armed Cartel Incursions From Mexico: Best Options For Prevention And Response |
04-May-2009 |
22 pages |
| Authors:
Davin E Rieke; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT
|
| As violence continues to increase in Mexico, and the value of supply lines between the U.S. and Mexico increase in importance to drug cartels, the need for a plan to deal with these groups forcing their way into the U.S. increases. The only entity able to match weapons and tactics with the former special-forces members of several cartel private armies is the Department of Defense. The purpose of this paper ... |
|
| Exploring the Combat Potential of Financial Managers as Expeditionary Bankers in the Contemporary Operating Environment |
04-May-2009 |
25 pages |
| Authors:
Cody L Zilhaver; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT
|
| At the operational level of war, during stability operations, little is done to link strategic and tactical economic objectives together. Using the host nation's banking system, the operational commander can nest economic objectives in a coordinated line of effort. Consequently, operational commanders should leverage the untapped potential of their uniformed financial managers to orchestrate economic objectives by cultivating the host nation's banking system as a framework to strengthen economic security ... |
|
| A Better Disaster Response: Building on a Solid Foundation |
04-May-2009 |
26 pages |
| Authors:
Michael L Smith; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT
|
| Recent analysis has shown the Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA) mission to be a qualified strategic success. However, beneath the strategic success story is the fact that the ad hoc nature of FHA mission organization as prescribed by current doctrine runs contrary to the established operational principle of unity of effort. This paper will assess several models that seek to rectify this problem through establishing coordinating bodies within the current Joint ... |
|
| Fratricide Prevention: An Opportunity to Develop a Joint Solution |
04-May-2009 |
22 pages |
| Authors:
Daniel J Wittnam; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT
|
| Technological advances in modern weaponry have provided the United States military with unparalleled speed, precision and lethality. However, with these newfound capabilities comes increased responsibility to ensure positive identification of the enemy in order to mitigate the risk to non-combatants and friendly forces. This task, that is extremely difficult to master during training, often proves overwhelming among the stress and uncertainty that defines the modern battlefield. Consequently, Operation DESERT STORM ... |
|
Reports by Corporate Author
