| Navy Integration into the Air Force-Dominated JFACC |
08 FEB 2000 |
20 pages |
| Authors:
Nicholas Mongillo; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
 | The Joint Force Air Component Commander's (JFACC) mission is to execute the joint air operations plan as outlined by the Joint Force Commander's (JFC) concept of operations. This paper will examine the Navy's integration and interaction within the Desert Shield / Storm JFACC, the Joint Task Force Southwest Asia (JTF-SWA) JFACC and the JFACC for Operation Allied Force (OAF). It will show the Navy is deficient ... |
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| Joint Theater Missile Defense: The Problem with Active Defense Doctrine |
08 FEB 2000 |
25 pages |
| Authors:
Bruce W. Barnhill; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| In today's dynamic and complicated environment of Joint Theater Missile Defense (JTMD) current doctrine provides ambiguous guidance to Theater Commanders in Chief (CINC) or Joint Force Commanders (JFC) in the proper establishment of JTMD priorities for theater assets. Currently there is no doctrinal system established, to provide Theater Commanders the guidance essential to properly employ of those JTMD assets to counter an ever-growing missile ... |
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| Operation Allied Force: What Happened to Operational Art |
08 FEB 2000 |
32 pages |
| Authors:
Joseph J. Leonard; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| Operational Art is the very heart of military planning. This is understandable and quite necessary, given the emphasis on joint operations in today's military. Despite the knowledge of the importance of operational art, leaders have failed to provide planners with the proper guidance and direction needed to succeed. The current dialogue regarding the success of Operation Allied Force has thus far brought a number of ... |
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| Gradual Escalation Bombing: Rolling the Dice in Kosovo |
08 FEB 2000 |
27 pages |
| Authors:
J. S. McPherson; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| NATO's apparent success against Slobodon Milosevich has pundits basking in a supposed breakthrough in the use of military force to conduct what has been termed "The doctrine of immaculate coercion". Their weapon of choice to conduct this type of warfare in Kosovo was the politically feasible strategy of gradual escalation bombing. However, gradual escalation should not be considered a viable strategy because it negates the inherent strengths ... |
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| Recent Amendments to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: Strategic Tool, Cruel Hoax, or Untenable Impediment to Foreign Policy |
08 FEB 2000 |
27 pages |
| Authors:
Brendan F. Ward; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| Paper considers whether recently amended Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act constitutes viable strategic tool in combating terrorism, or whether it is domestic law giving plaintiffs judgments they might never recover on or, lastly, that it might be a strategic tool, but one too troublesome in terms of foreign policy to be useful to government strategists. Paper concludes with judgment that a better strategic mechanism would allow an international ... |
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| The ARG as Self-Contained Force Package: Reconfiguring the ARG to Provide Adequate Organic Self Protection Capabilities |
08 FEB 2000 |
20 pages |
| Authors:
Tim M. Wilson; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| The Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) has insufficient force protection capabilites to successfully carry out its missions without excessive risk of catastrophic loss. Doctrinally the AREG is protected by external assets, which in reality are seldom available. Therefore, the ARG should be reconfigured to provide adequate organic force protection capabilites. Recommend augmenting the ARG with an AEGIS cruiser, 2 LAMPS ME III helicopters, and an SSN. ... |
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| Span of Control in Contingency Air Mobility Operations: The Case for a Tanker Director |
08 FEB 2000 |
27 pages |
| Authors:
Paul R. Murphy; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| Air Mobility Command's (AMC) air refueling tankers are the one key enabler critical to both rapid deployment and employment of airpower. This paper investigates the role of the Director of Mobility Forces (DIRMOBFOR) in the tanker command and control structure that stands up to support a joint task force (JTF). The thesis is that air mobility and combat-support C2 systems are different enough to warrant a ... |
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| Considering Morale as the Tenth Principle of War |
08 FEB 2000 |
31 pages |
| Authors:
Kent A. Michaelis; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| For the operational planners, one of the most important aspects is the consideration and planning surrounding the principles of war. The principles of war are so important, that failing to accommodate them normally leads to failure. Historically, morale too demonstrates incredible impact of the outcome of war. The degree morale impacts victory is such that it warrants consideration for inclusion as a principle, of war. To compare ... |
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| Ofensive Counterair During Operation Allied Force: Operational Shortfalls and Implications |
08 FEB 2000 |
24 pages |
| Authors:
Christopher L. Shay; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| After 78-days of offensive counterair operations during Operation Allied Force, U.S. and NATO forces failed to neutralize the Serbian integrated air defense system. The less than modern integrated air defense system continued to function and engage Allied aircraft suggesting we are not prepared to neutralize a state-of-the-art air defense system. Through critical a analysis of Operation Allied Force and Joint Task Force Noble Anvil, this paper discusses ... |
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| Operation ALLIED FORCE: Operational Planning and Political Constraints |
08 FEB 2000 |
22 pages |
| Authors:
Tom Munson; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| Analysis of the Kosovo crisis and the NATO operation reveal that no matter how highly effective and superbly executed, ALLIED FORCE was politically constrained nearly from start to finish. This paper will attempt to argue that while the tenets of operational planning existed, they were not followed during ALLIED FORCE planning. This was due in part because of political constraints, poor operational coordination, and mismanaged ... |
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| Morale: The Tenth Principle of War |
08 FEB 2000 |
23 pages |
| Authors:
Mark A. Sturges; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| There is no question that the nine principles of war currently embodied in the United States Joint Military Doctrine are valid. However, the principle "morale" should he included as the tenth principle of war. The characteristics of morale are common to the other principles of war, can stand the tests of time and technology, geography, medium of combat, and can be applied at all levels ... |
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| Is it Time for a SATCOM Civil Reserve Fleet? |
08 FEB 2000 |
33 pages |
| Authors:
Mark D. Bontrager; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| The U.S. military depends upon satellite communications (SATCOM) like never before. However, dedicated military SATCOM (MILSATCOM) does not provide enough capacity to meet the demands of today's warfighters. Current plans call for commercial SATCOM to fill the capacity gap. Unfortunately, the capacity just isn't there. Nor can it respond quickly enough to meet the surge-capacity needs of U.S. quick-response forces. Three frameworks have been proposed to mitigate ... |
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| Moral Factors: The 10th Principle of War |
08 FEB 2000 |
22 pages |
| Authors:
John S. Walsh; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| The nine principles of war first published in 1921 do not contain any serious analysis of the moral factors and have remained essentially unchanged. Moral factors include those intangible human elements that decisively contribute to combat power; these encompass courage, discipline, morale, esprit de corps, duty, and spirit. Unlike the United States, the importance of moral factors is recognized and established in the doctrines of several nations ... |
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| Is it Time to Use the Right Side of Our Brain? A Comparison of Analytical and Naturalistic Decision Making Processes |
08 FEB 2000 |
20 pages |
| Authors:
Brett F. Bonifay; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| As commanders, how do we make decisions? In scientific theory, there are two methods or models for the decision-making processes - the Analytical Decision-Making (ADM) model and the Naturalistic, or Recognitional, Decision- Making (NDM) model. The time one has to make a decision within a certain situation will influence the decision making process. With the factor of time most prevalent in this situation, a greater ... |
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| Shaping Today's Battlefield: Public Affairs as an Operational Function |
08 FEB 2000 |
27 pages |
| Authors:
John F. Kirby; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| Public affairs (PA) is more relevant to operational success than ever before and should be considered an operational function. Three developments support this contention. First, the mass media's ability to impact operations is getting stronger. Secondly, the often-ambiguous aims sought in most operations today require greater communication of military goals and objectives, as well as public support. Third, there has been an increasing reliance on PA support by ... |
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| Casualty Aversion: Implications for Policy Makers and Senior Military Officers |
08 FEB 2000 |
28 pages |
| Authors:
Charles K. Hyde; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| As the only remaining superpower, the United States has adopted a strategy of engagement to preserve our vital interests. Engagement depends on the instrument of military power, but our status as a superpower is challenged based on the perception a casualty-averse public limits our ability to intervene using military force. Research shows casualty aversion does not determine public support for military operations. The public weighs the costs ... |
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| The Operational Use of Non-Lethal Weapons |
08 FEB 2000 |
24 pages |
| Authors:
Robert T. Durkin; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| In the Post Cold War era U.S. military operation are becoming increasingly difficult to a societal aversion to the infliction of casualties. This aversion has migrated over time from an aversion to U.S. casualties, to an abhorrence of non-combatant casualties and now includes an aversion to the infliction of casualties on enemy combatants. This has combined with an increase in the complexity in the nature military ... |
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| Breaking Through the Wall: A Realistic Perspective of the Very Shallow Water (VSW) and Surf Zone (SZ) Mine Threat |
08 FEB 2000 |
30 pages |
| Authors:
Edward W. Eidson; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| The ability to project power ashore through amphibious operations is a Navy and Marine Corps core competency that must be maintained in order to allow global response as delineated in the National Security Strategy. Because of the VSW/SZ mine threat, the technological inability to defeat it, amphibious doctrinal rigidity, and "zero acceptable casualties" mentality, the United States has become incapable of projecting power ashore. This ... |
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| The Third Wave Metanoia: Breaking the Command and Control Paradigm |
08 FEB 2000 |
26 pages |
| Authors:
Patrick D. Frank; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| As the United States military enters the 21st century, the exponential advances of the Information Age will fundamentally transform the nation's operational warfighting capabilities, not through technical innovation, but rather in the dynamic transformation of command and control practices and organizational structures. Historically, decisive technological advances are a temporary phenomenon. Therefore, the state that is able to leverage technical advances with innovative command and ... |
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| Some Practical Advice for a Joint Force Commander Contemplating the Use of Blockage, Visit and Search, Maritime Interception Operations, Maritime Exclusion Zones, Cordon Sanitaire, and Maritim |
08 FEB 2000 |
44 pages |
| Authors:
James M. Ryan; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| This paper focuses on the Joint Force Commander's ability to leverage international law (relating to blockade, visit and search, maritime interception operations, maritime exclusion zones, cordon sanitaire, and maritime warning zones) as an asymmetric means to enhance naval operations. This paper historically analyzes the aforementioned areas of international law so that today's Joint Force Commander can apply the insights from lessons learned to current operational ... |
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| J-Sead for the Second MTW |
08 FEB 2000 |
28 pages |
| Authors:
Richard J. Fraenkel; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| The JFC assigned to fight and win a second MTW will be faced with a monumental task. He must neutralize the enemy's sophisticated integrated air defenses, keep casualties and collateral damage to a minimum, and do it with limited resources, specifically overcoming an acute shortage of dedicated SEAD assets. To meet this challenge, the JFC and his staff must fully employ J-SEAD doctrine and apply ... |
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| The End of Decisive Military Force: Are the Principles of War Still Relevant |
08 FEB 2000 |
26 pages |
| Authors:
S. R. Roth; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| Globalization is an unstoppable force of change that is greatly affecting human civilization and existence. Advances in technology, world population distribution trends, and competition for finite resources are but a few of the forces that are making our world smaller, more interdependent, and in greater cultural contact. One military consequence of these trends is that U.S. political leaders and operational military commanders can expect coalition ... |
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| Toward the Valued Ideal of Jointness The Need for Unity of Command in U.S Armed Forces |
08 FEB 2000 |
27 pages |
| Authors:
Logan Jones; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| The U.S. Armed Forces concept of jointness is flawed and, contrary to current rhetoric, the struggle to attain it is much more than simply overcoming force of habit and eliminating stovepipes. Such struggles are symptomatic of a larger, systemic problem: lack of unity of command. Promoting the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the five star rank and ceding to him operational and administrative ... |
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| A Goldwater-Nichols for MOOTW |
08 FEB 2000 |
29 pages |
| Authors:
Kemp L. Chester; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| One of the keys to success in Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) is effective interagency coordination. Recent history indicates a need to improve interagency coordination, at all levels, in the planning and conduct of MOOTW. The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, which succeeded in enhancing the coordination between the Services and improved their ability to operate as a joint force, provides a model for how this ... |
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| Complexity and Planning in the 21st Century: Intelligence Requirements to Unlock the Mystery |
08 FEB 2000 |
26 pages |
| Authors:
David R. Hunt; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| The strategy of battlespace dominance envisioned in Joint Vision 2010 demands that intelligence focus on support to decision-making by providing analytic estimates to reach planning decisions, and analyze opponent's reactions to those decisions. Planning for military operations in the environment envisioned in JV 2010 and Network Centric Warfare is inherently more complex than solutions that may be derived from the current joint intelligence planning doctrine based ... |
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| Making the Most of Peace and Humanitarian Operations |
08 FEB 2000 |
24 pages |
| Authors:
Antonio M. Edmonds; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| The U.S. military has traditionally been engaged in peace and humanitarian operations. These operations support the current National Security Strategy and can be counted on to constitute future military missions. The debate over whether or not the military should be tasked with such missions has outlived its value. Attention should be turned to the questions of when and how the military can be most effectively ... |
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| Coalition Interoperability: The Long Pole in the Tent |
08 FEB 2000 |
30 pages |
| Authors:
Anthony M. Fidrych; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States' military philosophy is no longer defined by a bipolar relationship with a global peer Competitor. Instead, emerging states and transnational belligerents now pose a more diffuse threat to our vital interests. Regional concerns around the world threaten to impact our stability and global economic security while technological innovations allow the actions of potential adversaries ... |
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| Computer Network Attack Versus Operational Maneuver from the Sea |
08 FEB 2000 |
25 pages |
| Authors:
Dale W. Herdegen; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| Operational Maneuver From The Sea (OMFTS) combined with the Marine Corps' use of mission command and control is a powerful and enabling concept. It amplifies Marine Corps combat power by coupling maneuver warfare with technological advances in speed, mobility, fire support, communications, and navigation to rapidly identify and exploit enemy weaknesses. OMFTS facilitates the warfighting functions of command and control, fires, maneuver, logistics, intelligence, ... |
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| Command, Control and Integration of Special Operations Forces into the General Purpose Force |
08 FEB 2000 |
20 pages |
| Authors:
Scott A. Harris; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| With the ever-increasing number of "non-traditional" missions the United States military is faced with in the twenty-first century, operational commanders will be required to form unique joint organizations designed to complete these missions. While not a new problem, joint force commanders of General Purpose Forces (GPF) must identify the appropriate way in which to integrate Special Operations Forces (SOF) into their plans. More specifically, ... |
|
| Operation Allied Force a Theoretical Review of Doctrine & Airpower |
08 FEB 2000 |
25 pages |
| Authors:
Richard A. Hand; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| In March of 1999, NATO engaged in Operation Allied Force (OAF), an operation widely touted by military and political leaders as successful. However, the means used and the expected duration required, in achieving " the victory" provides many operational art learning points. Moreover, the strategy implemented caused many top US officials, during the first weeks of the campaign, to doubt any victory without a significant ... |
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| Joint Operational Logistics: Steps Toward Unity of Effort |
07 FEB 2000 |
27 pages |
| Authors:
Donald E. Kirkland; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| Joint operational logistics must emphasize unity of effort to maximize combat power. Unity of effort is difficult to achieve within the current Service-oriented logistics framework. Joint doctrine already provides for a single command authority for logistics, but JFCs lack a modular, flexible organization for operational logistics. Recent operations have established ad hoc logistics command and control organizations that do not support Joint Vision 2010 or ... |
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| Inculcating Jointness: Officer Joint Education and Training from Cradle to Grave |
07 FEB 2000 |
31 pages |
| Authors:
Michael W. Carrell; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| A joint culture exists in the U.S. military as a result of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation and Skelton Panel on education. This culture is not enough however, and a need exists to improve officer Joint Professional Military Education and Training in order to develop better joint officers. This paper proposes a comprehensive cradle to grave approach of educating and training officers both in their own services ... |
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| Focused Logistics: A Link to Operational Success in "2010" |
07 FEB 2000 |
19 pages |
| Authors:
Jayme M. Jones; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| As a result of the end of the cold war, its impact on current threat assessments, changes in the National Security Strategy and defense posture and sufficiency reviews; U.S. Forces are transitioning through an inter-war period. Advancements in information technology and better business practices provide the opportunity for both a Revolution in Military Affairs and Military Logistics. Joint Vision 2010 provides the conceptual template for this ... |
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| Joint Contractor Logistics Support Doctrine: Ensuring Success on the 21st Century Battlefield |
06 FEB 2000 |
19 pages |
| Authors:
Charles G. Chiarotti; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| This paper asserts that the U.S. military reliance on Contractor Logistics Support (CLS) has risen to the extent that, without it, U.S. forces may be in jeopardy of being unable to accomplish their assigned missions. To counter this threat, clear guidance and doctrine must be developed to define the parameters and the environment in which contractors can and must be employed in the Joint arena. Specific ... |
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| C4I Joint Interoperability: Can We Achieve the JV2010 Vision? |
04 FEB 2000 |
21 pages |
| Authors:
Patrick J. Kilroy; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| In 2010, the joint force commander (JFC) will be unable to leverage the vision of Full Spectrum Dominance enabled by a global Command and Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4I) as predicted in Joint Vision 2010 (JV2010) At the root of the problem is a complex array of obstacles and hurdles. Today, each Service is developing C4I structures at different rates of change, with varying ... |
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| Theater Missile Defense: Finding a Suitable Command and Control Structure |
02 FEB 2000 |
24 pages |
| Authors:
Steven W. Holmes; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| Current command and responsibilities guidance provided in Joint Pub 3-01.5 (Doctrine for Joint Theater Missile Defense) assigns the operational elements of Joint Theater Missile Defense to different commands and staffs. In order to provide the requisite unity of command and effort for the mission and in light of the potential strategic impact of a successful attack, a more unified command structure is needed. This can ... |
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| Liaison With Religious PVOs |
24 JAN 2000 |
24 pages |
| Authors:
Mark G. Steiner; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| The Joint Task Force Commander will neither command nor control non- governmental organizations NGOs and private volunteer organizations PVOs during humanitarian assistance operations HAOs. While the civil-military operations center CMOC is assigned the task of liaison with relief organizations, the present composition of the CMOC lacks the resident capability to communicate and coordinate with religious PVOs. The Chaplain Corps and the JTF Chaplain, leveraging the ... |
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| U.S. Army Special Forces Unconventional Warfare Doctrine: Engine of Change or Relic of the Past? |
07 JAN 2000 |
36 pages |
| Authors:
Robert E. Kelley; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| As a mission and as a concept, unconventional warfare (UW), is the heart and soul of the United States Army's Special Forces (SF). Since SF was created in 1952, UW operations have been the "touchstone" for all developments in the organization. Doctrine for Joint Special Operations correctly defines a relevant UW mission for U.S. Special Operations Forces. But army Special Forces doctrine for UW operations ... |
|
| Korean Futures Project: International Simulation, 26-28 January 2000 |
JAN 2000 |
29 pages |
| Authors:
C. D. Walton; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| The main purpose of this simulation was to explore international reactions to political change in North Korea and to the broader security implications of developments in the North. Players also confronted related difficulties in the scenario, such as refugee flows across international borders. To accomplish this, the simulation engaged mid- to high-level participants from 15 countries in a United Nations Security Council setting. Every country except North Korea was represented ... |
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| Influencing the World-Island: A Maritime Strategy for the 21st Century |
21 OCT 1999 |
26 pages |
| Authors:
Mark A. Becker; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| Building upon a grand strategy vision of primacy, an analytical perspective of realism, and applying the strategic approaches of top-down, capability/mission, hedging, and technology, a new maritime strategy for the 21st Century has been formulated. This strategy is based upon an offensive littoral capability, an offensive/defensive missile capability, and a sea control, open ocean capability. Concerned only with the venue of surface warships, this ... |
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| Formative Peacetime Engagement Workshop Report |
SEP 1999 |
156 pages |
| Authors:
Bradd C. Hayes; Theophilos C. Gemelas; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| Critics of recent U.S. foreign policy are using the end of the Kosovo crisis as a time to reevaluate America's interests and how it should use its armed forces. Pundits feel the timing is especially propitious since many of the current crop of presidential candidates are just beginning to formulate their own foreign and defense policies. According to The Economist, four lines of criticism are receiving the most attention. First, ... |
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| An Analysis of the Impact of Network-Centric Warfare on the Doctrine andTactics, Techniques and Procedures of Intelligence at the Operational Level |
01 JUN 1999 |
69 pages |
| Authors:
Charles Harvey; Lance Schultz; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| This project sought to determine the impacts of network centric warfare (NCW) on the planning and direction of intelligence at the operational level, and what changes in joint intelligence doctrine (JID) and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) should/should not be made to support it? To meet those objectives, the analysis compared the NCW concept to the fundamentals upon which intelligence is to be employed in military ... |
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| KAZAKHSTAN: United States Engagement for Eurasian Security |
28 MAY 1999 |
104 pages |
| Authors:
Craig E. Campbell; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| This paper researched the proposition tnat United States in Central Asia was important to our national security strategy. It analyzed whether or not the United States should develop a tailored foreign policy for engaging the Republic of Kazakhstan. To accomplish that objective, the essay compared alternative policy options for advancing U.S. interests identified in the 1998 United States National Security Strategy for a New Century (NSS). Therefore, this essay has ... |
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| A U.S. Regional Strategy for the Caspian Sea Basin |
17 MAY 1999 |
27 pages |
| Authors:
Adrian W. Burke; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| Geopolitics has become a dominant factor in American policy once again. The Caspian Sea basin has not yet been designated a "pivotal region" by American strategists. However, a region with oil and natural gas fields larger than those discovered three decades ago in the North Sea and on Alaska's North Slope, one that potentially has reserves greater than Kuwait, will undoubtedly rise in importance. U.S. ... |
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| Information Warfare: Defining the Legal Response to An Attack |
17 MAY 1999 |
|
| Authors:
James P. Pottorff; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
 | This paper discusses the difficulty in determining whether an information warfare attack, such as a computer virus, can be treated as an "armed attack" for purposes of national defense under the United Nations charter. As the U.S. and its allies become increasingly sophisticated in information operations, corresponding development of appropriate international law protecting these operations has been exceedingly slow. In this regard, the paper ... |
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| Pipeline Politics: U.S. Corporations Lead Foreign Economic Policy |
17 MAY 1999 |
26 pages |
| Authors:
Adrian W. Burke; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| The United States industrial base has an overwhelming impact on foreign economic policy. U.S. multinational corporations, especially those in industries vital to the security of the nation, wield enormous power and influence on government policy. In fact, it is industry that is most often the first unofficial American ambassador to enter regions of the world not yet fully integrated into the global community or economy. The ... |
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| War Without Risk: Sustained Strike Operations and American Strategy |
17 MAY 1999 |
27 pages |
| Authors:
Douglas W. Gregory; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| Sustained air strikes to coerce enemies have limited effects due to competing objectives, limited legitimacy, and enemy reaction. Treating them as wars rather than punishment, using some ground forces, and focusing strikes on enemy capabilities instead of enemy will are actions that can improve future sustained strike operations. |
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| Posse Comitatus: Some Thoughts on Loosening its Restrictions within the Department of Defense |
17 MAY 1999 |
33 pages |
| Authors:
Daniel A. Neptun; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| Posse Comitatus law and/or service policies have prohibited DoD forces from becoming involved in domestic/civil law enforcement since the late 1870s. Focus upon the "war on drugs" during the 1980s generated new laws that significantly changed DoD's role in this long-term battle. Current National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS) indicate ongoing involvement by DoD forces in the strategy to decrease demand, ... |
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| Force Protection of Sea Based Logistics, A Historical Perspective |
17 MAY 1999 |
21 pages |
| Authors:
Michael A. Siebe; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| The United States is heavily reliant on sea based logistics shipping. This shipping gives the United States great flexibility but it is also a critical vulnerability. During WW II Japan was a nation dependent on maritime shipping and Japan failed to provide adequate resources to protect that shipping. The results were disastrous. The U.S. and Great Britain also experienced attacks on maritime shipping in WW I ... |
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| Intermediate Operational Commanders. A Role for Naval Destroyer SquadronCommanders |
17 MAY 1999 |
22 pages |
| Authors:
Michael J. Sweeney; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| Advances in Information Technology (IT) systems and decision aids offer increased speed of command in warfare. What effect does IT have on the authority of intermediate operational commanders such as Destroyer Squadron (DESRON) Commanders in the U.S. Navy? Intermediate commanders remain vital to manage the "how" to complete the operational scheme of Joint Force Commanders (JFC) despite the increased availability of shared information. DESRON ... |
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