| OPDEC: The Operational Commander's Key to Surprise and Victory |
17 JUN 94 |
47 pages |
| Authors:
Jeffrey A. Kwallek; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
 | This paper examines operational deception (OPDEC) as the operational commander's key to achieving surprise and victory. The paper describes what OPDEC is and discusses some important principles for conducting successful deception operations. In the context of those principles, it reviews four highly successful deception cases--the 1956 Sinai Campaign, the 1967 Six Day War, the 1973 Yom Kippur War, and Desert Storm, highlighting significant lessons learned and their relevance for the ... |
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| Operational Art and Logistics: Achieving Excellence in the Design and Conduct of Military Campaigns |
17 JUN 94 |
28 pages |
| Authors:
Mark S. McTague; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| This paper examines the essential elements of operational art and the vital role logistics serves in realizing the benefits of operational art. The operational art and logistic issues discussed in this paper are examined against the backdrop of Operation Restore Hope. This paper focuses on the military activity of campaigning - the thesis of this paper follows. The operational level of war is waged by commanders who plan, organize, conduct, ... |
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| How Much Press Do You Need to Cover a War? |
17 JUN 94 |
29 pages |
| Authors:
David M. Edgington; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| There has been in the United States a traditional rivalry between the military and the media concerning press coverage of combat action. The proliferation of the media in the last few conflicts has sparked new DoD policies, but none dealing directly with limiting the aggregate numbers of journalists in proportion to the operation. The historical basis of the argument is presented, media views and concerns reviewed, and the operational commander's ... |
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| The Colonels' Revolt: Eisenhower, The Army, and The Politics of National Security |
17 JUN 94 |
115 pages |
| Authors:
Jay M. Parker; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| This paper reviews the budgetary politics and interService rivalries involved in the formulation of President Dwight D. Eisenhower's defense policies. Specifically, the paper chronicles the reaction of the U.S. Army General Staff to proposals to greatly increase U.S. reliance on strategic air power at the expense of Army force structure and modernization. The impact of The Revolt on joint policy making in general and Cold War defense policies in particular ... |
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| Operational Perspectives of the Okinawa Campaign (Operation Iceberg) |
16 JUN 1994 |
36 pages |
| Authors:
Richard Zee; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| Nearly fifty years ago, a joint and combined task force undertook the largest naval campaign in the Pacific theater--the Okinawa campaign. Only ten to fifteen years ago, our military establishment, civilian and military thinkers, started formulating and espousing the operational level of war and operational art. To paraphrase a wise and astute writer, these are 'new words for an old activity.' The leaders of the past, by their actions and ... |
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| International Quick Response Forces |
06 JUN 94 |
117 pages |
| Authors:
George J. Murphy III; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| Increasing in number and complexity over the past five years, the UN's peacekeeping efforts have met with mixed success. The search for more effective multilateral ways to preserve peace and promote regional stability leads to consideration of an international quick response force. A survey of collective action options - AD HOC coalitions, regional security organizations and the United Nations - identifies the UN as the organization best suited for the ... |
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| Mission in the East: The Building of an Army in a Democracy in the New German States |
Jun 1994 |
60 pages |
| Authors:
Mark E Victorson; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| At midnight on 2 October 1990 the German Democratic Republic (GDR) ceased to exist. The following day the armed forces of the Federal Republic of Germany, the Bundeswehr, took control of the personnel, equipment, and installations of what had been the National People's Army (Nationale Volksarmee or NVA). By any reckoning this was a massive undertaking and one of great historical significance. It was massive because of the sheer amount ... |
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| Analysis of German Operation Art Failures, The Battle of Britain, 1940 |
16 MAY 94 |
39 pages |
| Authors:
John Turner; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| The Battle of Britain was the first major defeat for the Germans of WWII. The Battle of Britain was an air operation designed to give Germany air superiority over both the English Channel and England. Gaining air superiority was considered by the Germany Army and Navy as absolutely essential prior to 'Operation Sea Lion,' the landing and invasion of England. Because the Luftwaffe was never able to establish the requisite ... |
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| Gallipoli 1915-Opportunity Lost? |
16 MAY 94 |
25 pages |
| Authors:
Craig H. Murray; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| The 1915 Allied campaign to the Dardanelles was intended to reopen the straits and force Turkey out of the war. Although the campaign cost some 250,000 Allied casualties and ultimately failed to achieve its military objectives, many consider it to have been a golden opportunity to have defeated Germany through a peripheral front. The initial portion of this paper discusses the strategic soundness of the campaign while the major portion ... |
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| Forward Presence and the Search for Peacetime Influence |
16 MAY 94 |
30 pages |
| Authors:
Bernard H. Fullenkamp; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| Within the search for peacetime influence, forward presence has gained a new preeminence among the elements of U.S. National Defense Strategy. The proactive nature of forward presence makes it conceptually well suited to seize current opportunities and therefore influence the shape of the future international security environment. The shift in U.S. National Security Strategy, from containment to enlargement, will force a conceptual shift in what forward presence is asked to ... |
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| Another Crisis Can We Count on the Reserves? |
16 MAY 94 |
28 pages |
| Authors:
Gary A. Corbett; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| Historical experiences have shown that assumptions regarding the activation of Reserve Component forces have proven to be unrealistic. As a result, a regional CINC who needs the capabilities of reserve forces for a rapidly developing crisis or a peacetime contingency operation may find that these resources are not available when needed. This paper examines these problems in light of the new post Cold War environment and a shrinking force structure. ... |
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| Army Reserve Component Accessibility during Operations Other Than War: Some Implications for the CINC's |
16 MAY 94 |
41 pages |
| Authors:
Edward P. McNamee III; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
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| As the active component of the Army force structure is reduced, an increasingly larger proportion of the force structure will be filled by forces of the Army Reserve and Army National Guard. The trend toward increased utilization of U.S. armed forces in operations other than war will require a significantly greater degree of participation by units of the Reserve Component, particularly since the lion's share of combat support and combat ... |
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| Command, Control and Emerging Technologies: Implications for the Operational COmmander |
16 MAY 94 |
30 pages |
| Authors:
Richard J. Sandy; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| The influence of technology on the command and control process is examined in both historical and future contexts. The implications for the operational commander and the operational level of war of emerging technologies for C2 is analyzed with reference to the principles of war. Significant advances in computers, communications, information exchange, sensor and surveillance, and decision support aids will continue to provide benefits to the C2 process in the future. ... |
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| Combined Task Force Provide Comfort: A New Model for 'Lead Nation' Command? |
16 MAY 94 |
50 pages |
| Authors:
Bruce A. Weber; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| Operation Provide Comfort, perhaps the most challenging humanitarian relief effort ever, commenced in April 1991, six weeks after the end of Desert Storm. At the conclusion of its first phase three months later, 23,000 personnel, 30 nations, and 50 relief agencies had demonstrated the potential power of an effective coalition. Combined Task Force (CTF) Provide Comfort established a new standard of excellence in coalition command structure and command relationships. Unique ... |
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| The Operational Reserve Carrier: A Timeshare Co-Operative Opportunity for Marine TACAIR and the Naval Reserve Carrier Air Wing |
16 MAY 94 |
31 pages |
| Authors:
Thomas F. Nagelin Jr; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
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| At H-hour on D-day, when it is time for the 'grunts' to 'kick in the door' with an amphibious assault, USMC Tactical Aviation (TacAir) must be in position, ready to counter enemy air and provide Close Air Support (CAS). While the Corps TacAir awaits the securing of a Naval Expeditionary Air Field (NEAF) or other such battlefield-proximate airfield ashore, they must in the interim, have an effective base from which ... |
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| Ballistic Missile Defense: Putting a Roof over our Forces in the Theater |
16 MAY 94 |
36 pages |
| Authors:
Kevin E. McHugh; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
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| This paper examines the development of ballistic missile defense and the concepts that operational commanders should consider to counter growing threats posed by potential adversaries possessing ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In Desert Storm, the Scud missiles launched served primarily as terror weapons, as they were not militarily very significant, due to their poor accuracies, conventional warheads, and low launch rates. But, with accelerating technological advances and ... |
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| Operational Aspects of the Dardanelles Campaign, 1915 |
16 MAY 94 |
27 pages |
| Authors:
L. C. Mason; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
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| An operational analysis of the Dardanelles campaign during World War I from the perspective of the operational commander. The Dardanelles campaign had the potential to offer an alternative to the war of attrition on the Western Front and significantly expedite the war's ending. The causes of the campaign's ultimate failure are many and the literature analyzing the failure is equally extensive. In the interest of brevity, the Navy only portion ... |
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| War with the Osprey: Technology and the Limits of Vision in Warfare |
16 MAY 94 |
31 pages |
| Authors:
James D. Hildreth; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| The development of tiltrotor aircraft, specifically the V-22, is analyzed as a revolutionary technology and is compared with the development of similar technology from military history. The role and relative importance of technology in modern warfare is discussed in the context of Clausewitzian theory. The inability of governments and military organizations to easily assimilate revolutionary innovations is highlighted. Factors such as doctrine and rigid organizational thinking, among other things, are ... |
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| Let's Put Joint Back into JFACC |
16 MAY 94 |
26 pages |
| Authors:
Lynn M. Champagne; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
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| The Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) concept remains a very controversial subject. A survey of the doctrinal differences among Services highlights the origins of some very contentious issues. U. S. Air Force doctrine places heavy emphasis on the strategic use of airpower. Existing or evolving doctrine in the U. S. Army, U. S. Navy, and U. S. Marine Corps lean more-to the tactical use of aviation assets. The JFACC ... |
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| Allied Failure in the Norwegian Littoral, 1940-Operational Level of War for Today |
15 MAY 94 |
31 pages |
| Authors:
Carradean L. Brown; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
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| Allied operations and strategy in the spring 1940 Norwegian campaign which ended with the evacuation of Narvik are analyzed. These operations were the first joint, combined warfare in WWII and conducted in a littoral environment. They provide valuable operational level of war lessons to current day commanders and planners of the United States Armed Forces who will direct decreased forces in various littoral environments around the world. The majority of ... |
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| The Effects of World War II Submarine Campaigns of Germany and the United States; A Comparative Analysis |
15 MAY 94 |
43 pages |
| Authors:
G. H. Pearsall; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| The effectiveness of the German and United States submarine campaigns during World War II is compared by analyzing the genesis of each campaign, the commitment to each and the effort to overcome the losses imposed by submarine warfare. This comparison highlights one aspect of the strategic and operational consequences of conflict with an adversary able to build and maintain a superior industrial base in support of the military effort. This ... |
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| The Siberian Expedition 1918-1920: An Early Operation other than War |
13 MAY 94 |
61 pages |
| Authors:
Robert L. Smalser; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
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| When the Bolsheviks seized power in Russia during November, 1917 they immediately ceased hostilities with the Germans. The potential impact on the Allies was catastrophic, German Eastern Front forces combined with 1.6 million repatriated POW's could be returned to fight on the Western Front. The European Allies quickly demanded that American and Japanese troops be sent to reopen the Eastern Front, launching what would evolve into an early operation other ... |
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| Gallipoli Revisited: An Operational Assessment of the 1915 Dardanelles Campaign |
04 MAY 94 |
40 pages |
| Authors:
William M. Piersig; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
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| In 1915, the Allies conducted a series of operations -known as the Gallipoli Campaign -- against the Turks in an attempt to force the Dardanelles Straits and threaten Constantinople. The campaign began with high hopes -- the potential rewards were inviting and the risks appeared to be minimal. Turkey was the weakest member of the Central Powers. Against her, the allies would direct an impressive array of naval and amphibious ... |
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| Operation Earnest Will |
08 MAR 94 |
29 pages |
| Authors:
Michael Gurley; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) have been conducted throughout U.S. military history and are expected to play an important role in future military operations. One example of MOOTW was the United States/Kuwaiti Tanker Escort Mission, "Operation Earnest Will", conducted in the Persian Gulf in 1987-1988. It was a joint military operation in support of U.S. vital interests that provides a model for the study of MOOTW. This is a ... |
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| Operations Other than War: How Effective is our Unity of Effort? |
94 |
32 pages |
| Authors:
William H. Millward; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| Unity of effort between the Departments of Defense and State during operations other than war is analyzed through a study of inter-departmental organizational relationships, an assessment of assigned duties at the country team and regional level, and a comparison of Defense and State Department personality types. This analysis will show that much work has already been accomplished to physically connect the two organizations, that primary mission responsibilities are clearly stated, ... |
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| Analysis of U.N. Peacekeeping in Cambodia |
94 |
30 pages |
| Authors:
Frank M. Buerger; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| U.N. peacekeeping operations are analyzed by studying the large complex mission in Cambodia. Of all the large-scale missions attempted by the U. N., the only success was achieved in Cambodia. The lessons learned in Cambodia are being applied to missions throughout the world. This analysis reviews the background and development of the mission in Cambodia. An analytic checklist is developed to find the lessons learned, measure the effectiveness of a ... |
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| The Burden of Trafalgar: Decisive Battle and Naval Strategic Expectations on the Eve of the First World War |
Oct 1993 |
51 pages |
| Authors:
Jan S Breemer; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| This paper is written as part of a book-length study, currently in progress, of the origins and development of naval offensive thinking during the five decades or so leading up to the First World War. Its particular focus is the idea of the decisive battle, i.e., the belief that dominated naval thinking in the Victorian and Edwardian periods that the goals of war at sea could, would, and ought to ... |
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| Training Requirements and Training Availability for United Nations Peacekeeping Forces |
20 SEP 93 |
32 pages |
| Authors:
Douglas V. Smith; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| This memorandum provides a brief overview of peacekeeping training opportunities and their availability around the globe. This paper addresses the training requirements associated with the unique military requirements inherent in United Nations peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace-Enforcement operations. It also considers the adequacy of worldwide training available in support of such operations. In conclusion, it recommends creation of training opportunities in areas where they are currently inadequate to support anticipated United ... |
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| Beyond Mahan: Proposal for a U.S. Naval Strategy in the Twenty-First Century |
Aug 1993 |
60 pages |
| Authors:
Gary Anderson; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| Late in 1991, the National Command Authority published a new national security strategy that stressed a regional rather than a global approach. Shortly thereafter the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) issued a new national military strategy which also stresses a regional approach. The new military strategy has as its basis four fundamental legs: forward presence, crisis response, strategic deterrence, and reconstitution. This study examines the naval strategic contribution to each ... |
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| Tactical Victory Leading to Strategic Defeat: Historic Examples of Hidden Failures in Operational Art |
22 JUN 93 |
57 pages |
| Authors:
Gordan E. Van Hook; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| Tactical victories that ultimately lead to strategic defeat can provide explicit examples of the importance of operational art in linking tactical actions to strategic goals. By studying their causes, the fundamental principles involved and their applicability to today's military planner and commander can be presented. An analysis of five possible causes of tactical victory and strategic defeat is presented with two historic examples each for illustration. The dangers of tactical ... |
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| Operational Art: Your End State Is Your Start Point |
18 JUN 93 |
31 pages |
| Authors:
Richard E. MacNealy; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| Operational Art is important to U.S. military success, but little attention has been paid to what can make a commander successful at this level of war. Military institutions utilize different methods to help structure the process associated with operational Art, but don't emphasize the first step - a vision of the end state. Military history shows that success at the operational level of war depends on the operational commander's ability ... |
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| The Logistics Lessons of the Gulf War: A Snowball in the Desert? |
18 JUN 93 |
36 pages |
| Authors:
Keith M. Wilkinson; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| The experiences of the U.S. military during Desert Shield/Desert Storm are analyzed to determine whether they provide lessons on logistics support for contingency operations which, irrespective of the size of force or theater of employment, are applicable to commanders at the operational level. The scope of discussion is limited to those aspects of logistics which the commander could affect in the near-term. As an introduction to the discussion logistics activities ... |
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| Naval Forces: Valuable Beyond the Sum of Their Parts |
18 JUN 93 |
40 pages |
| Authors:
Michael F. Applegate; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| Naval forces offer unique capabilities and unparalleled flexibility to our national decision makers and operational commanders. An analysis of their capabilities is conducted to highlight the versatility and value that naval forces offer due to their expeditionary nature. Naval surface and amphibious forces are examined in order to identify the range of operations that they can conduct. Capabilities, limitations, and the inherent flexibility of naval surface and amphibious forces are ... |
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| Did the USCG Use the Lessons Learned from the 1980 Mariel Boatlift from Cuba in Dealing with the Haitian Migration Crisis of 1991-2? |
18 JUN 93 |
50 pages |
| Authors:
Robert C. Parker; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| During the Mariel Cuban Boatlift in 1980, we essentially had a government sponsored evacuation of Cuban refugees, assuming them all to be fleeing an oppressive Communist regime. Eleven years later, our government vacillated in policy guidance, making a challenging humanitarian crisis intervention mission much more difficult to execute. Operation ABLE MANNER continues to deal with this problem today. Clarity and consistency of policy guidance must be defined in order to ... |
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| The Operational Impact and Implications of United States Strategic Command |
18 JUN 93 |
33 pages |
| Authors:
Worth Carter; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| As the Cold War drew to a close, a new unified command was born, that was originally conceived at the height of the Cold War in the late fifties and sixties. However, the environment of the time, specifically interservice rivalry and a fear of losing turf or mission responsibility, thwarted all efforts to implement this new command. Ironically, following the end of the epic struggle with the Soviet Union, this ... |
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| Managing Operational Intelligence Overload: Guidelines for Avoiding Decision Paralysis |
18 JUN 93 |
32 pages |
| Authors:
Wendy L. Lichtenstein; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| This paper presents guidelines to help the operational commander reduce the risk of intelligence overload which causes delays in making decisions. A brief review of history shoes that technological advancements have increased the reliability and usefulness of intelligence. But technology has not replaced the human factor in intelligence work and command. In fact, technology is not a panacea. Instead, developments may actually contribute to intelligence overload. Additionally, certain factors in ... |
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| Critical German Submarine Operations Versus Allied Convoys During March 1943: An Operational Analysis |
18 JUN 93 |
46 pages |
| Authors:
Bruce E. Grooms; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| German submarine operations against allied convoys, during March 1943 is critically analyzed from an operational perspective. The theater commander's operational scheme is dissected for the purpose of identifying lessons which can be applied to the planning and execution of today's theater operations. A brief historical account of the early phases of the war and the events and decisions which preceded the critical convoy battles will be followed by an analysis ... |
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| Coalition Warfare: More Power or More Problems? |
18 JUN 93 |
46 pages |
| Authors:
Mark O. Schissler; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| Coalition warfare is both complex and complicated: the paradox is that while often a source of strength, coalitions are as often a source of weakness as well. Although coalitions are historically the 'American way of war, ' little has been written which explores the advantages and difficulties of combined operations. This paper reviews historical coalitions, especially Korea and the Gulf War, two examples which show that although cumbersome, coalitions offer ... |
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| Creating the Command and Control Differential |
18 JUN 93 |
41 pages |
| Authors:
Jane A. Boyd; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| The Desert STORM experience and the explosion in electronic technologies have highlighted the need for a joint war fighting strategy that attacks the enemy's command and control process while protecting our own capabilities. Understanding the Command and Control (C2) process and the intelligence cycle interaction is key to the implementation of a joint strategy. By attacking key functions in enemy C2 process, Command, Control, and Communications Countermeasures (C3CM) strategies can ... |
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| Rapid Research and Development: The Operational Commander's Ultimate Smart Weapon |
18 JUN 93 |
41 pages |
| Authors:
James H. Lynch; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| The limitless capacity of America's industrial power must be available to our unified and specified commanders to influence the outcome of future conflicts. Today's defense acquisition system does not allow this weapon to be used by the operational commander because of over regulation and congressional micro management. The capability exists in America's industrial base to produce weapons using CAD/CAM technology to meet real time battlefield needs. The last fifty years ... |
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| Military-Media Relations: Finding a Solution Acceptable to All |
18 JUN 93 |
30 pages |
| Authors:
Julie K. Neumann; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| This paper addresses military-media relations in the operational theater and the need to devise a means of effectively employing the media in that environment. The option examined here is to plan for the use of the electronic and print media as separate entities. By capitalizing on the strengths of each, both the military and the public will be better served. Past U.S. military operations are also analyzed to determine lessons ... |
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| Putting the Commander in Control--the Light Cavalry Regiment's Utility to the Joint Commander |
18 JUN 93 |
36 pages |
| Authors:
Michael N. Smith; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| With the demise of the Soviet Union, the world is entering a new phase and the United States has responded with an entirely new National Security Strategy. As a consequence, our military focus will be on more numerous, and likely regional operations, carried out at the operational level. The United States Army's Light Armored Cavalry Regiment Is the single best asset for ensuring the Joint Task Force Commander gains and ... |
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| Counter-Deception, The Commander's Responsibility |
18 JUN 93 |
35 pages |
| Authors:
Joseph Sokol Jr; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| Deception is an integral part of war. Sun Tzu advocated it in his time as a means to gain an advantage, and the same holds true today. But, deception is not infallible or inevitable, its effects can be countered by the operational commander. This paper explores a general theory of logic for the operational commander to counter deception. Before a commander can counter deception, he must understand the theories, principles ... |
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| Effective Fleet Integration: Improving the Employment of the Carrier Battle Group to Meet Regional Challenges in the Post Cold War Era |
18 JUN 93 |
31 pages |
| Authors:
Patrick Driscoll; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| The purpose of this paper is to determine how the Navy can better train and employ its premier fleet asset, the carrier battle group, to meet the new regional challenge. The focus is on the armed forces available today and how their employment could be optimized in light of reductions in the military budget. By briefly examining recent operational employments of the carrier battle group, weaknesses in flexibility and inter-operability ... |
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| An Intelligence Process for the Operational Commander |
17 JUN 93 |
27 pages |
| Authors:
Christopher J. Munn; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| This paper examines a process that has been in use by the U.S. Army at the tactical level of war for 15 years. It is a process that systematically analyzes the weather, terrain and the enemy in order to effectively predict an enemy's likely course of action. The products of this process are used by the tactical commander to identify the best possible friendly course of action in order to ... |
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| Hydropolitics in the Middle East and U.S. Policy |
JUN 93 |
87 pages |
| Authors:
Elizabeth A. Green; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| This paper discusses hydropolitics in the Middle East, the most critical example today of the worldwide problem of diminishing fresh water resources relative to increasing demands stemming from growing populations and development. The paper concentrates information essential to understanding regional hydropolitics, including information about past and current U.S. attempts to influence Middle Eastern hydropolitics. Technical solutions which apply to the supply-side and demand-side of regional and national water balances are ... |
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| UN Stand-by Forces: The Next Step Towards a System of Collective Security |
JUN 93 |
|
| Authors:
John P. Lumetta; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
 | This paper examines the product of the UN Stand-by Forces Working Group as a model for an enhanced peacekeeping capacity within the United Nations. Various financial remedies are analysed as a necessary precondition for the success of any expanded military role for the United Nations. Domestic US executive and Congressional initiatives and policy formulations are assessed to determine likely US policy towards adoption of the model Collective security, UN Stand-by ... |
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| The United Nations Standing Force a Qualitative Analysis of Strategic and Operational Options for the United States |
JUN 93 |
68 pages |
| Authors:
Michael A. Brooks; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| The Secretary General of the United Nations has requested that member states designate certain forces to participate in a United Nations standby force or a force in readiness (UNFR). He believes, as do many others, that early and rapid deployment of peacekeeping forces into a crisis may be the best preventive medicine. The objective of this pa-Der is to examine the Secretary General's proposal and its alternatives relative to the ... |
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| Bosnia: A Question of Intervention |
10 MAY 93 |
37 pages |
| Authors:
Brett D. Barkey; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| This paper analyzed the propriety of military intervention in Bosnia- Hercegovina. Using four general categories of rationales; security, influence, moral, and ideological, the author submits nine analytical questions to three strategies for the use of force (1) use of ground forces; (2) use of air strikes; and (3) imposition of the no-fly zone. The strategies were assessed in- terms of whether they would meet the military objectives inferred from the ... |
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| Employment of U.S. Forces As Part of Mandated United Nations Peacekeeping and Peacemaking Operations |
10 MAR 93 |
|
| Authors:
John P. Rubel; NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
|
| The United Nations, reborn as a peacekeeper In the post Cold War era, is becoming involved in more and more operations world wide, yet the current operations continue to be conducted on an ad hoc basis. The Secretary-General has proposed that member nations create special peace enforcement units permanently available to the Security Council. The United States has also become increasingly involved in peacekeeping and peacemaking operations in the post- ... |
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