| Informing the Transformation |
APR 2005 |
33 pages |
| Authors:
David S. Alberts; ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMMAND CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE) WASHINGTON DC
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 | Frequently Asked Questions: What is NCW? What is Power to the Edge? * Why are they critical to success in the 21st Century? * How is NCW related to transformation? To EBO? * Are NCW and Power to the Edge proving out in practice? * Are we creating new vulnerabilities? * Will it be harder for coalition partners to work with the U.S.? * Is an Information Age transformation affordable? ... |
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| Department of Defense Critical Infrastructure Protection. 2002 Executive Report |
2002 |
26 pages |
| Authors:
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMMAND CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE) WASHINGTON DC
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 | The concept of attacking and protecting infrastructure assets critical to a nation's warfighting capabilities is as timeless as war itself. From its inception in 1998, the success of the DoD Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) Program has relied on the leadership of the Joint Staff, the vigilance of the uniformed services, the dedication of the DoD workforce to recognize infrastructure vulnerabilities, and the ability of our nation's first responders to manage ... |
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| Information Superiority & the Future of DoD - Opportunities, Risks, and Challenges |
Jan 2001 |
181 pages |
| Authors:
David S Alberts; ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMMAND CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE) WASHINGTON DC
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 | Agenda: *Bottom Line Assessment; *Information Superiority: the critical enabler; *From Shortfalls to Recommendations; *Critical Shortfalls; *What Needs to be Done. |
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| Public Key Infrastructure Roadmap for the Department of Defense |
18 Dec 2000 |
43 pages |
| Authors:
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMMAND CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE) WASHINGTON DC
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 | The Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) Roadmap establishes the enterprise-wide end-state for the Department of Defense (DoD) PKI and outlines the evolution strategy and timeline for the availability of the Department's PKI capabilities. Also, it identifies critical risk areas that must be addressed, summarizes measures that will be undertaken to mitigate those risks, and highlights roles and responsibilities of organizations involved with its realization. This document is an update to the ... |
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| Modernization of the Global Positioning System |
01-Nov-2000 |
14 pages |
| Authors:
Michael Shaw; Kanwaljit Sandhoo; David Turner; ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMMAND CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE) WASHINGTON DC
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 | More than two decades have now passed since the construction of the GPS operational control segment (OCS), including the Master Control Station (MCS) at Schreiver AFB, Colorado and worldwide monitoring stations, and launch of the first GPS satellites. During that time, several generations of satellites have been designed, built, and launched, and operations are routinely supported by the OCS. Today, Global Positioning System (GPS) is entering into the new millennium ... |
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| Department of Defense Handbook for Writing Security Classification Guidance |
NOV 1999 |
54 pages |
| Authors:
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMMAND CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE) WASHINGTON DC
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 | Good security classification practice calls for the timely issuance of comprehensive guidance regarding security classification of information concerning any system, plan, program, or project; the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security. Precise classification guidance is prerequisite to effective and efficient information security and assures that security resources are expended to protect only that which truly warrants protection in the interests of ... |
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| Lessons Learned from Information Superiority Experiment 1.1 (ISX 1.1) |
1999 |
8 pages |
| Authors:
David S. Alberts; F. R. Richards; Stuart H. Starr; ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMMAND CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE) WASHINGTON DC
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 | ISX 1.1 was conducted in the Summer 1998 in concert with the USAF Expeditionary Force Experiment (EFX) 98. The broad objectives of ISX 1.1 were two-fold. Substantively, ISX 1.1 was to confirm the hypothesis that information from multiple sources could be fused into engagement quality data and distributed in real time to achieve joint suppression of enemy air defenses (JSEAD) mission objectives against mobile medium-to-high altitude surface to air missiles ... |
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