| Endogenous Split Awards as a Bid Protest and Procurement Management Tool |
18 Jul 2012 |
74 pages |
| Authors:
Peter J Coughlan; William Gates; NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS AND PUBLIC POLICY
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 | When competitors for a federal government contract feel that the contract has been unfairly or unlawfully awarded, they can protest the contract award. A protest stops a contract award while the protest is evaluated for merit and remedy, as appropriate. While legitimate award protests improve procurement efficiency, integrity, and accountability, frivolous award protests create significant contract delays and cost growth. There is increasing interest in mechanisms that reduce frivolous contract ... |
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| Endogenous Split Awards as a Protest Management Tool: A Modeling & Computational Approach |
May 2012 |
57 pages |
| Authors:
Peter J Coughlan; William Gates; NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS AND PUBLIC POLICY
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| Bid Protests & Split Awards: Agenda Managing bid protests in DoD procurement Simple model of bidding & protest process Split awards as a protest management tool Key question: What is the right split? Bids & prices with fixed split awards Bids & prices with endogeneous split awards |
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| The Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM): Integrating Monetary and Non-monetary Reenlistment Incentives |
Nov 2011 |
210 pages |
| Authors:
Peter J Coughlan; William R Gates; Brooke M Zimmerman; NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS AND PUBLIC POLICY
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| This research addresses the potential retention and cost impacts of providing an optimal individualized portfolio of non-monetary and monetary incentives to influence reenlistment and retention behavior in enlisted Sailors. Specifically, it explores three mechanisms for administrating enlisted retention: a purely monetary auction, a Universal Incentive Package (UIP) auction, and the Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM). In this text, the mechanisms are simulated, their outcomes compared and their respective strengths and ... |
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| Split Awards and Bid Protests in Acquisition |
May 2010 |
15 pages |
| Authors:
Peter J Coughlan; William Gates; NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS AND PUBLIC POLICY
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| Managing Bid Protests * Objective is not to minimize number of bid protests * Protests may correct procurement mistakes: -- Honest mistake: Limited information and bounded rationality -- Dishonest mistake: Bias by procurement officials * Objective is to right size number of protests -- Encourage protests that correct (significant) mistakes -- Discourage protests that don't make significant corrections * What are DoD's levers of control for managing the number and ... |
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| Innovations in Defense Acquisition: Asymmetric Information and Incentive Contract Design |
15 Dec 2009 |
88 pages |
| Authors:
Peter J Coughlan; William Gates; NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS AND PUBLIC POLICY
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| This report continues a research stream initiated in 2007 to apply mechanism design concepts to the DoD's acquisition transactions. Recognizing the central importance of private information and incentives, mechanism design reflects the decisions made by individuals and institutions based on the information they possess and the incentives they face. The designer chooses the mechanism (institutional structure) that promotes the desired outcome (decision or resource allocation). This research addresses asymmetric information ... |
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| Asymmetric Information in Defense Acquisition: Bid Protests and Containment Strategies |
May 2009 |
25 pages |
| Authors:
Peter J Coughlan; William R Gates; Francois Melese; NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS AND PUBLIC POLICY
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| Innovations in Defense Acquisition Auctions: Lessons Learned & Alternative Mechanism Designs |
May-2008 |
28 pages |
| Authors:
William R Gates; Peter J Coughlan; NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS AND PUBLIC POLICY
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| This briefing looks at how auctions are used in DoD acquisition. It suggests an alternative auction structure. |
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