| Exploratory Analysis of Supply Chains in the Defense Industrial Base |
Apr 2012 |
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| Authors:
James R Dominy; Scot A Arnold; Forrest R Frank; Jenny R Holzer; James N Richmann; INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES ALEXANDRIA VA
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 | This study used readily available data to perform an exploratory analysis of the supply chains for two sectors of the Defense Industrial Base: unmanned aerial systems, and cyber equipment and services. The results of this study will contribute to a major Department of Defense initiative-the sector-by-sector, tier-by-tier evaluation of the Defense Industrial Base. The study evaluates supply chains in the two sectors to identify segments of the supply chain that ... |
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| The Mechanisms and Value of Competition for Major Weapon Systems |
Apr 2011 |
110 pages |
| Authors:
James R Dominy; Scot A Arnold; Colin M Doyle; Brandon R Gould; Bruce R Harmon; Susan L Rose; Robert W Thomas; Karen W Tyson; INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES ALEXANDRIA VA
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 | The purpose of this study is to evaluate the impact of competition on the acquisition of Major Defense Acquisition Programs. The assessment is based on case studies and previous analytic studies of the impact of competitive acquisition processes on the acquisition of major weapon systems. The paper identifies the goals of a competitive acquisition strategy, and the competition regimes available to acquisition officials. Each of the competition regimes is evaluated ... |
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| WSARA 2009: Joint Strike Fighter Root Cause Analysis |
Jun 2010 |
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| Authors:
Scot A Arnold; Ji S Byun; Harley A Cloud; Alexander O Gallo; Matthew W Gonwa; Bruce R Harmon; Prashant R Patel; Colin D Sullivan; John R Hiller; Patricia F Bronson; INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES ALEXANDRIA VA
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| Growth in unit cost estimates for the Joint Strike Fighter program, from the initial estimate in 2001 to the current estimate in the 2009 Selected Acquisition Report (SAR), has led to a critical Nunn-McCurdy breach and a subsequent recertification effort in FY 2010. The 2009 SAR reported a 57 percent increase in both the average procurement unit cost (APUC) and the program acquisition unit cost (PAUC), compared to the initial ... |
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| A Real Options Approach to Valuing the Risk Transfer in a Multi-Year Procurement Contract |
Oct 2009 |
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| Authors:
Scot A Arnold; Marius S Vassiliou; INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES ALEXANDRIA VA
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| Using real options analysis, we developed a methodology to estimate the value of the revenue risk reduction that the government provides when it enters into a multi-year procurement (MYP) contract with a defense contractor. We apply methods used to price financial options to estimate the value of revenue risk reduction with a notional MYP contract with a representative defense contractor. While the government often uses MYP contracts to buy weapon ... |
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| Defense Department Profit and Contract Finance Policies and Their Effects on Contract and Contractor Performance |
Feb-2009 |
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| Authors:
Scot A Arnold; Bruce R Harmon; Karen W Tyson; Kenton G Fasana; Christopher S Wait; INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES ALEXANDRIA VA
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| The Defense Department, through the military services, buys equipment and services for which no open market exists. In negotiating the contracts for these acquisitions, the government has policy guidelines to aid the contracting officer in developing a reasonable amount of profit to pay the contractor. The goal of profit policy is a contract price that reimburses the contractor for its costs, provides the necessary incentives to yield beneficial performance, and ... |
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| Can Profit Policy and Contract Incentives Improve Defense Contract Outcomes? |
Feb-2009 |
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| Authors:
Scot A Arnold; David L McNicol; Kenton G Fasana; INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES ALEXANDRIA VA
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| This paper examines the use of profit and contract finance policies as tools to motivate defense contractors to deliver systems that perform as required on time and within budget. It explores three areas where contract outcomes appear to be linked to these policies: the weighted guidelines; incentive contract features; and major sole-source procurement programs. With the weighted guidelines-provisions in the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) for determining the base ... |
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| Infrastructure Rationalization in the U.S. Naval Ship Industrial Base |
Nov-2008 |
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| Authors:
Scot A Arnold; Patricia F Bronson; Karen W Tyson; INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES ALEXANDRIA VA
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| Because of decreased demand for new ship construction the number of U.S. shipyards capable of handling new construction and conversion programs for the U.S. Navy decreased through the 1970s and 1980s. In 1993 the Defense Department established a policy to consolidate and rationalize (reduce infrastructure) within the defense industry in the face of the lower demand experienced following the end of the cold war. IDA looked at infrastructure rationalization in ... |
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| Assessment of Industry Investment in U.S. Domestic Production of Strategic Materials |
Oct-2008 |
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| Authors:
Scot A Arnold; Karen W Tyson; Benjamin S Aronin; INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES ALEXANDRIA VA
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| IDA assisted the Strategic Materials Protection Board in assessing the extent to which domestic producers of strategic materials are investing to ensure continued domestic production of these materials. IDA identified the domestic producers of strategic materials developed a data request to the companies and developed evaluation criteria. The paper presents analyses of company investment using public data and a non-proprietary summary of the survey results. We found that U.S. strategic ... |
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| Can Profit Policy and Contract Incentives Improve Defense Contract Outcomes? |
Oct 2008 |
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| Authors:
Scot A Arnold; David L McNicol; Kenton G Fasana; INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES ALEXANDRIA VA
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| This paper examines the use of profit and contract finance policies as tools to motivate defense contractors to deliver systems that perform as required, on time, and within budget. It explores three areas where contract outcomes appear to be linked to these policies: the weighted guidelines; incentive contract features; and major sole-source procurement programs. With the weighted guidelines--provisions in the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) for determining the base ... |
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| Award Fee Study Group Report |
01-Jan-2008 |
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| Authors:
Scot A Arnold; Deborah P Christie; Richard P Diehl; Frank Kendall; David L McNicol; Gene H Porter; Robert R Soule; INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES ALEXANDRIA VA
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| Section 814(c) of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2007 required a federally funded research and development center (FFRDC) to assess mechanisms that could ensure an independent evaluation of contractor performance supporting award fee determinations. Specifically, the FFRDC was to assess the advantages of (1) using separate award fee pools controlled by the independent fee determination board and (2) allowing contractor assessments across programs in contrast to ... |
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