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Abstract:
The words integrated and integration have appeared for many years in their association with defense acquisition. Although integration has been discussed and written about extensively, making it happen has not been successful in such a non-integrated environment of multiple Services and agencies, multiple contractors, multiple responsible test organizations, and multiple customers. In 1983, Congress looked towards test and evaluation (T&E) officials to take a giant step toward integration in defense acquisition by incorporating responsibility for operational T&E with designated Service and agency Operational Test Agencies (OTAs), and the creation of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E). This move created an integrated chain of testing, evaluating, and reporting at the completion of major defense acquisition programs (MDAPS) to the two customers of defense acquisition: 1) the warfighter who uses the equipment, and 2) Congress, representing the U.S. taxpayer who pays for the equipment. While this integration of responsibility and authority for operational T&E (OT&E) has been very effective, a drawback is that OT&E by nature requires test items that are near the completion of development so that they can be operated by their ultimate users in an operationally representative environment. Therefore, the majority of OT&E must be accomplished near the end of the development cycle. Here within lies the problem; too much stuff happens during the earlier, significantly non-integrated, developmental part of the acquisition process that the two key customers above have no knowledge of or influence over.
| Limitations: |
 APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE |
| Description: |
Journal article |
| Pages: |
5 |
| Report Date: |
Dec 2010 |
| Report Number: |
A736435 |
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