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Abstract:
This paper is about the Russian military's use of operational art to achieve its strategic objectives during the Russo-Georgian War of August 2008. In this brief war, the Russian military, in a quick and decisive campaign, overwhelmed Georgian forces to gain control of two breakaway republics, destroyed much of Georgia's armed forces on land and sea, and caused NATO to reconsider its offer of membership to Georgia. This study focuses on the Russian military's present conception of operational art, the relationship between operational art and strategy, and the ability of the Russian armed forces to apply it in a war, a matter of strategic importance to Russia. To accomplish this, this study examines the roots of Soviet thought and practice on operational art and points out the significant changes over time which have affected current thought and practice. The paper analyzes significant aspects of the campaign in Georgia that reflect not only Russia's rich tradition of operational art, but also reflect Western thinking and new Russian thinking. The study examines the future of Russian operational art based on recently announced military reforms.
| Limitations: |
 APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE |
| Description: |
Research paper |
| Pages: |
46 |
| Report Date: |
25-Mar-2009 |
| Report Number: |
A726005 |
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