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Abstract:
The control of information is strategically decisive in counterinsurgency, according to John Nagl in Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. Information is the main weapon that insurgents use to gain the vital support of the populations in which they operate. In many cases information control is nothing more than portraying certain events in a calculated way. It may include spreading propaganda, twisting facts, or blatantly spreading untruths. While this type of information control is necessary and is employed by both insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, it is reactive in nature. Winning a counterinsurgency requires a proactive approach to information control. This is achieved by knowing and understanding what the local populations are thinking and feeling, and then using nonlethal targeting to exploit that information. As the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan continue, it becomes more and more apparent that nonlethal targeting is often more effective than lethal targeting in COIN operations. Killing every insurgent is normally impossible. Attempting to do so can also be counterproductive in some cases... Dynamic insurgencies can replace losses quickly. Skillful counterinsurgents must thus cut off the sources of that recuperative power. Some sources can be reduced by redressing the social, political and economic grievances that fuel the insurgency. There are two relatively untapped sources of intelligence collection that if used correctly can help achieve the goal of isolating the insurgents from the local population: open source intelligence (OSINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT).
| Limitations: |
 APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE |
| Description: |
Research paper |
| Pages: |
7 |
| Report Date: |
Jan-2008 |
| Report Number: |
A719494 |
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