Abstract: This paper is a case study of the British military intervention into Sierra Leone in 2000. The successful British intervention led to the defeat of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and final peace accords, restored order to a failed state, and allowed the democratic restoration of the government of Sierra Leone. The paper will explore the following points: What was British foreign policy at the time and what impact did it have in the decision to intervene?; What was British counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine at the time and was it useful for the forces in Sierra Leone?; Did the British forces use their own doctrine or was the situation in Sierra Leone unique?; and Why was the intervention successful and what lessons can be drawn from it? The author analyzes the United Kingdom's actions against its own doctrine, rather than against the doctrine of the United States or another country. There is one major assumption for this case study. The author categorizes the intervention into Sierra Leone as successful. The justification for this assumption is current-day Sierra Leone. Instead of a war-torn failed state, Sierra Leone now has lasting peace, has disarmed its insurgent forces, has ended the large-scale human rights abuses of the past, and has democratic elections -- not coups -- determining the leadership of the country.
| Limitations: |
 APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE |
| Description: |
Master's thesis |
| Pages: |
110 |
| Report Date: |
14 DEC 2007 |
| Report Number: |
A595574 |
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