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Abstract:
This monograph examines the ambiguities of Chinese strategic and military thought and introduces a new concept -- Chinese Strategic Art -- to help analysts understand how the People's Republic of China (PRC) thinks about and applies strategy and military capabilities. The level of analysis will be constrained to the strategic-level leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the People's Liberation Army (PLA). The study begins with a multidisciplinary review of military, philosophical, and psychological literature to define and understand Chinese strategic culture and lay the foundation for the concept of Chinese Strategic Art. This section highlights the differences between Western and Chinese thought to further analysts' understanding of the distinct Chinese approach to strategy. The second section develops the concept of Chinese Strategic Art and describes its elements. The Chinese Strategic Art approach is the creation and application of a strategy that allows an inferior force to defeat a superior one. When the PRC does resort to armed force to solve a conflict, it is likely to do so on its own terms and in a manner that gives it an asymmetric advantage over its adversary. The third section applies the Chinese Strategic Art concept to three case studies to assess the conditions that are likely to influence the PRC's decision to use military force: the Korean War, the Sino-Vietnamese War, and the conflict with Taiwan. The first two case studies focus on why the PRC leadership chose to go to war and why they viewed these conflicts as overall successes in spite of tremendous military losses. The Taiwan case study uses the conclusions from the first two cases to evaluate the possibility of future war with China.
| Limitations: |
 APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE |
| Description: |
Monograph |
| Pages: |
62 |
| Report Date: |
Apr 2010 |
| Report Number: |
A450325 |
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