Abstract: Technical intelligence collection is perceived as inadequate for collection of adequate information on enemy intent, disposition and capability in the deep battle zone upon commencement of hostilities. This essay examines the feasibility of using US Army SF assets for the collection of HUMINT intelligence in the deep battle zone. The case for selecting Special Forces rather than Rangers is discussed. An examination is made on training, sustainment, and selection of personnel for this type of mission. The development and criteria for HUMINT sources is covered and a preference for operating agencies to work in conjunction with the SF command is recommended. Further comment is made on command and control for this type of mission and the level within a theater of operations where the support and conduct of HUMINT operations should be conducted. Problems and limitations generated by the threat are examined and equipage of teams touched upon with emphasis on the need for passivity. All data was taken from unclassified material and limited personal observation of SF personnel, principally Special Forces engaged in military training team activities at First Special Forces Operations command at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.
| Limitations: |
 APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE |
| Description: |
Student essay |
| Pages: |
23 |
| Report Date: |
25 MAY 1984 |
| Report Number: |
A270941 |
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