The issue of close air support is one of the most emotional issues between the Army and the Air Force. Both services interpret close air support in terms of the lives of their personnel. The fundamental question previous studies have not addressed is why the Army wants or needs fixed wing close air support? If it is 'the decisive force,' why does it need help from another service? A combat effective combined arms forces should not need fixed wing close air support or needs it only when its organic fire support is unavailable. Army and Air Force doctrine is compared to determine how the services think about war in general, and close air support specifically. Current Army and Joint doctrine admit that rotary wing as well as fixed wing aircraft can perform the mission. However, some Army officers see the helicopter as a maneuver element and therefore not. The study examines World War II and the Gulf War to demonstrate the major thesis. During World War II, specifically the Battle for France in 1944-45, the U.S. Army was not as 'combat effective' as the German Army opposing it and often required fixed wing aircraft and artillery to make-up the difference. The Gulf War demonstrates that the Army can dominate the close fight, because its combat effectiveness and better weapons surpassed the Iraqis. The principal operational requirement for close support is to destroy armored weapons systems; tank, artillery, infantry fighting vehicles. The Army's attack helicopter and artillery systems provide the means to meet this requirement. Because they are organic they are more responsive and can be integrated more readily into the ground commander's scheme of maneuver than Air Force aircraft. Improvements to artillery systems will increase close support capabilities as well. The conclusion is the Army can perform all the close support tasks it requires.