Of Pressure, Passions, and Adventurous Offensives: Iraq through an Alternate Lens

Authors: Andrew H. Smith; ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA

Abstract:

The U.S. invasion of Iraq within the context of the Global War on Terrorism is, arguably, an "adventurous offensive." Remarkable similarities exist between the strategic environment in place before the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq and what may be defined as another adventurous offensive: the Athenian expedition to Sicily over two millennia ago. Succinctly, and within the context of the greater Peloponnesian War, Athens sought to keep the pressure on its Spartan rival in a "long war" for cultural supremacy. By 414 B.C. the expedition had fallen largely into disarray. Any hope of salvaging what arguably from the start was an adventurous commitment of military power faded in the shadows of Syracusan defenses and amidst disjointed and ultimately ineffective Athenian tactics. The Athenian expedition to Sicily, as described by Donald Kagan, was an undertaking whose purpose and feasibility remain controversial, and which ended in defeat and different degrees of disaster. The strategic environment in which the expedition took place, characterized explicitly as the collision of the identity of Athenian strategic culture with that of Sparta, offers a myriad of lessons to modern policymakers and strategists. This project examines the U.S. decision to invade Iraq against the historical backdrop of the Athenian expedition to Sicily in 415 B.C. Research reveals how cultural identity and by extension the world view of policymakers can influence strategic perspectives and decisions and lead to military operations incongruent with policy aims. Research also reveals how history can serve as a viable aid in understanding the strategic environment and logic behind strategic decisions. This paper will examine the logic that led the United States to invade Iraq through the historical background of the Athenian expedition to Sicily in 415 B.C. The author concludes with several strategic lessons that might be of benefit to modern policymakers and strategists.

Limitations:

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE